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TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY:
THE FEAR OF FRANKENSTEIN, THE MYTHOLOGY
OF PRIVACY AND THE LESSONS OF KING LUDD
K. A. TAIPALE
This article suggests that the current public debate that
pits security and privacy as dichotomous rivals to be traded one
for another in a zero-sum game is based on a general
misunderstanding and apprehension of technology on the one
hand and a mythology of privacy that eonflates secrecy with
autonomy on the other. Further, political strategies premised
on outla wing particular technologies or techniques or seeking to
constrain technology through laws alone are second-best - and
ultimately futile - strategies that will result in little security
and brittle privacy protection.
This article argues that civil liberties can best be
protected by employing value sensitive technology development
strategies in conjunction with policy implementations, not by
opposing technological developments or seeking to control the
use of particular technologies or techniques after the fact
through law alone. Value sensitive development strategies that
take privacy concerns into account during design and
development can build in technical features that can enable
existing legal control mechanisms and related due process
procedures for the protection of civil liberties to function.
This article examines how identification, data aggregation
and data analysis (including data mining), and collection
technologies intersect with security and privacy interests and
suggests certain technical features and strategies premised on
separating knowledge of behavior from knowledge of identity
based on the anonymization of data (for data sharing, matching
and analysis technologies) and the pseudonymization of identity
(for identification and collection technologies). Technical
requirements to support such strategies include rule-based
processing, selective revelation, and strong credential and audit.
I. PRELUDE
At the turn of the century technological development was
occurring at a rate that dizzied the mind. These technological
TAIPALE
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developments were bringing a better standard of living to all,
yet the gap between the rich and poor was becoming more
pronounced. The government, fearful of foreigners, enacted
repressive laws and the intellectual elite suggested that the
government was too powerful and that charges of treason were
too easily leveled.1
It was during this period - the beginning of the
nineteenth century - that Lady Mary Wollstonecroft Shelley
wrote her novel Frankenstein2 and the Luddite movement was
born.3 It is claimed that Frankenstein and the monster capture
"the complex duality of the Romantic soul, the dark as well as
the bright side, the violent as well as the benevolent impulses,
the destructive as well as the creative urges"4  So too with
advanced information technology and the duality of our concerns
with security and privacy.
II. INTRODUCTION
The current public debate that pits security and privacy
as dichotomous rivals to be traded one for another in a zero-sum
game is based on a general misunderstanding and apprehension
of technology on the one hand and a mythology of privacy that
conflates secrecy with autonomy on the other. Further, political
strategies premised on outlawing particular technologies or
techniques or seeking to constrain technology through laws
1 See generally CAROLLY ERICKSON, OUR TEMPESTUOUS DAY: A
HISTORY OF REGENCY ENGLAND (1986).
2 MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: THE 1818
TEXT, CONTEXTS, NINETEENTH-CENTURY RESPONSES, MODERN CRITICISM (J.
Paul Hunter ed., 1996).
3 See MALCOLM I. THOMIS, THE LUDDITES: MACHINE-BREAKING
IN REGENCY ENGLAND (1972); KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE
FUTURE: THE LUDDITES AND THEIR WAR ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION:
LESSONS FOR THE COMPUTER AGE (1996). Luddites was the name given to
groups of workingmen in the industrial centers of England who rioted and
began breaking knitting machines (called frames, thus "frame breaking"),
and later cotton looms, to the introduction of which they attributed
unemployment and low wages. The original Luddite movement occurred
between 1811 and 1816 and was harshly suppressed by the government.
There was no political aim involved and no real organization to the
movement. Later worker movements that took up the Luddite banner with a
political agenda were the precursors to the industrial labor union movement.
Today, the term Luddite is used to describe anyone who is perceived to
oppose technological developments or change.
4 PAUL CANTOR, CREATURE AND CREATOR: MYTH-MAKING AND
ENGLISH ROMANTICISM 108 (1984).
126 2004-2005
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alone are as doomed to failure as Ned Ludd's 5 swing of the
sledgehammer - and will result in little security and brittle
privacy protection.
Security and privacy are not a balancing act but rather
dual obligations of a liberal democracy6 that present a wicked
problem for policy makers. Wicked problems are well known in
public policy 7 and are generally problems with no correct
solution. Wicked problems reveal additional complexity with
each attempt at resolution and have infinite potential outcomes
and no stopping rule - that is, the process ends when you run
out of resources not when you reach the correct solution.8 There
is no fulcrum point - as is implicit in the balance metaphor - at
which point the correct amount of security and privacy can be
achieved. Wicked problems occur in a social context and the
wickedness of the problem reflects the diversity of interests
among the stakeholders. 9 Resolving wicked problems requires
an informed debate in which the nature of the problem is
5 The name Luddite is variously attributed as having its origin
from Ned Ludlam, the son of a framework knitter, or the mythical figures
Ned Ludd or King Ludd. Compare, e.g., Thomis, supra note 3, at 11-12 with
the entry for 'Luddites' in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2001) at
http://www.bartlebv.com/65/lu/luddites/html. See also, Erickson, supra note
1, at 61 ("General Ludd").
6 "In a liberal republic, liberty presupposes security; the point
of security is liberty." Thomas Powers, Can We Be Secure and Free? 151
PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 5 (Spring 2003). Powers goes on to argue that the
politicization of the civil liberties debate has resulted in a false dichotomy - a
choice between liberty and security - that is inconsistent with the liberal
political foundation on which this country was founded. Id. at 16-20 "From
[Madison's] point of view, it is clear that there is not so much a 'tension'
between liberty and security as there is a duality of our concern with
security, on the one hand, and with liberty, on the other." Id. at 21.
7 Horst Rittel & Melvin Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory
of Planning, 4 POLICY SCIENCES, 155-159 (1973) and Horst Rittel & Melvin
Webber, Planning Problems are Wicked Problems, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
DESIGN METHODOLOGY (N. Cross ed., 1984) 135-144.
8 Stopping when you have a solution to a complex problem that
is "good enough" within your resource constraints has been referred to as
"satisficing". HERBERT A. SIMON, SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 28-30 (3,d
Edition 1996, 1969).
9 Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,
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understood in the context of those interests, the technologies at
hand for resolution, and the existing resource constraints. 10
In a technologically mediated information society, civil
liberties can only be protected by employing value sensitive
technology development strategies in conjunction with policy
implementations, not by opposing technological developments or
seeking to control the use of particular technologies or
techniques after the fact through law alone.11 Value sensitive
development strategies that take privacy concerns into account
during design and development 12 can build in technical features
that enable existing legal control mechanisms for the protection
of civil liberties and due process to function. 13
Code is not law, but code can bound what law, norms and
market forces can achieve. 14 Technology itself is neither the
10 "Because of social complexity, solving a wicked problem is
fundamentally a social process" and requires "creating shared understanding
about the problem, and shared commitment to the possible solutions." Id. at
17.
11 See Julie E. Cohen, Symposium: The Law and Technology of
Digital Rights Management: DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575,
609-617 (2003) (arguing for building privacy protection into Digital Rights
Management (DRM) code (in addition to law) by employing value sensitive
design and development strategies. "[Bioth judicial and regulatory sanctions
are second-best strategies for ensuring effective [privacy] protection for all
users. A far more effective method of ensuring that information users
actually enjoy the privacy to which they are entitled would entail building
privacy into the design of DRM technologies in the first instance." Id. at 609).
12 See Ben Shneiderman & Anne Rose, Social Impact
Statements: Engaging Public Participation in Information Technology
Design, in BATYA FRIEDMAN, HUMAN VALUES AND THE DESIGN OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY. ("Constructive criticism and guidelines for design could help
protect us against the adverse ramifications of technology such as ...
dissatisfaction with privacy protection." Id. at 118); see generally Batya
Friedman et al., Value Sensitive Design: Theory and Methods (Draft of June
2003), at http://www.ischool.washington.edu/vsd/vsd-theorv-methods-draft-
june2003.pdf ("Value Sensitive Design is a theoretical grounded approach to
the design of technology that accounts for human values in a principled and
comprehensive manner throughout the design process.").
13 See generally K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic
Security. Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SC. & TECH.
L. REV. 2 (2003) [hereinafter, Taipale, Data Mining; Paul Rosenzweig,
Proposals for Implementing the Terrorism Information Awareness System, 2
GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 169 (2004).
14 See Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
3-8 (1999) ("[Code] constitute[s] a set of constraints on how you behave ...
The code or ... architecture ... constrain[s] some behavior by making other
behavior possible, or impossible."). Id. at 89. Lessig writes that behavior is
128 2004-2005
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problem nor the solution, rather it presents certain
opportunities and potentials that enable or constrain public
policy choice. Technical features alone cannot eliminate privacy
concerns, but by incorporating such features into technological
systems familiar privacy protecting due process mechanisms (or
their analogues) are enabled. 15
This article examines how identification, data aggregation
and analysis (including data mining), and collection technologies
currently being considered for use in the context of domestic
security intersect with security and privacy interests and
suggests certain technical features and strategies that can help
ameliorate these concerns. This article proposes that technical
development strategies premised on separating knowledge of
behavior from knowledge of identity based on the anonymization
of data (for data sharing, matching and analysis technologies)
and the pseudonymization of identity or authorization (for
identification and collection technologies) can help protect
individual autonomy while still meeting security needs.
Technical requirements to support such strategies include rule-
based processing, selective revelation, and strong credential and
audit. 16
III. SOME ASSUMPTIONS
This article focuses on the intersection of technology and
domestic and national security in the context of the current 'war
on terrorism' 17 but the analysis presented herein is equally
controlled (regulated or constrained) through a dynamic interaction of legal
rules, social norms, market forces and architecture (or code). Id. at 83-99.
15 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13 (setting out a proposed legal
and procedural framework designed to exploit technical features like those
described in this Article).
16 See also ISAT 2002 Study, Security with Privacy, Dec. 13,
2002 (discussing the purely technical aspects of security with privacy),
available at http://www.taipale.org/references/isat studv.pdf (formerly at
http://www.darpa.mil/iao/secpriv.pdf); James X. Dempsey & Paul Rosenzweig,
Heritage Foundation, Technologies That Can Protect Privacy as Information
is Shared to Combat Terrorism (May 26, 2004), available at
http:1/www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefenseImll.cfm (discussing
data anonymization, rules permissioning, and immutable audit trails).
17 I use the phrase 'war on terrorism' throughout this article
because it is the prevailing metaphor for the current conflict between
organized, but generally stateless actors using asymmetric means, including
politically or religiously-motivated violence, against U.S. and other global
institutional interests. But f Terry Jones, Why Grammar is the First
TAIPALE
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applicable to law enforcement more generally - subject,
however, to certain caveats. In particular, to the extent that
there is a relationship between law enforcement applications
and privacy concerns, the lesser the crime targeted the greater
the hurdle for any new technology or wider use that implicates
those concerns.18
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to
delineate precisely where the line between preemptive and
reactive strategies should be drawn by delimiting particular
types of crimes that meet particular criteria, or by specifying
which government organs or agencies should be permitted
particular uses. Rather, this article is primarily concerned with
the over-arching issues involved in employing advanced
information technologies to help identify and find actors who are
hidden among the general population and who have the
potential for creating harms of such magnitudes that a
consensus of society requires that government adopt a
preventative rather than reactive approach. 19
The events of 9/11 have put to rest any doubts that we
face a formidable threat from certain organized but generally
state-less forces that are intent on inflicting serious damage on
US interests, including the killing of large numbers of innocent
civilians. 20 Regardless of one's view of the particular political
Casualty of War, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2001. ("How do you
wage war on an abstract noun?"). But see generally note 113 infra (discussing
metaphor).
18 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.40.
19 In response to the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. Department of
Justice and the FBI have undertaken to reorganize their mission from the
traditional role of investigating and prosecuting crime that has already
occurred to that of preventing future acts of terrorism. See U.S. Department
of Justice, Fact Sheet: Shifting from Prosecution to Prevention, Redesigning
the Justice Department to Prevent Future Acts of Terrorism
(May 29, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news2002/05/
fbireorganizationfactsheet.pdf
20 See, e.g., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, Overview of the Enemy (2004) available at htt2:/iwww.9"
1lcommission.govihearings/hearing12/staff statement 15rpdf. In addition to
the almost 3,000 civilian deaths, the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center towers has been variously estimated to have caused between $50
billion and $100 billion in direct economic loss. Estimates of indirect losses
exceed $500 billion nationwide. General Accounting Office U.S. Congress,
GAO-02-700R, Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September
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strategy being used in response, the current threat is real and,
among other things, we need to enlist technology, and reform
organizational structures, to help counter this threat.21 To date
we have not taken sufficient advantage of information
technology to help secure the nation against these kinds of
threats. 22 However, technology cannot provide security by itself,
and we also need to adopt new organizational structures and
procedures to take advantage of opportunities that information
technology can make available. 2
3
At the same time, however, we must recognize that the
use of these technologies and procedures can be intrusive on
certain privacy interests that help protect individual freedom
and political autonomy, and are core to our political liberties.24
These interests must also be protected. It has become cliche, yet
remains axiomatic, that every compromise we make to civil
liberties in the 'war on terrorism' is itself a victory for those who
would like to destroy our way of life. 25  Terrorism itself is a
21 See, e.g., Markle Foundation, Protecting America's Freedom
in the Information Age: A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force at 1-3
(2002), available at http://www.markletaskforce.orgi [hereinafter First
Markle Report] (the nation must capitalize on its leadership in information
technology).
22 See, e.g., JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,
2001 HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, H. REP. No. 107-792, S. REP. No. 107- 351 (2002)
("While technology remains one of this nation's greatest advantages, it has
not been fully and effectively applied in support of U. S. counter terrorism
efforts. Persistent problems in this area include ... a reluctance to develop
and implement new technical capabilities aggressively.") [hereinafter Joint
Inquiry Report] at xvi.
23 See, e.g., First Markle Report, supra note 21, at 9 ("Though
we need technology to secure our nation, a successful domestic intelligence
and information strategy should start with the way we organize our people to
take advantage of innovation."); Markle Foundation, Creating a Trusted
Network for Homeland Security.* Second Report of the Markle Foundation
Task Force at 8-9 (2003) available at http://www.markletaskforce.org
[hereinafter Second Markle Report] ("[building a networked community for
homeland security] requires changes in policies, procedures, and the use of
technology."); See also Committee on Science and Technology for Countering
Terrorism, National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of
Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (2002), available at
http :i/wwwnap]edu/html/stctiindex~html.
24 See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967)
and Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609 (1999).
25 "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Attributed to
TAIPALE
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complex problem. Eliminating the current terrorist threat
involves a mix of three essential strategies. 26
First, we must eliminate political preconditions to
terrorism. We must solve unresolved conflict throughout the
world, end lack of economic and political opportunity, and
generally make the world safe for democratic processes and civil
society. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these
issues fully.27 Second, we must harden targets. 28 Of course,
target hardening generally only influences an adversary's
target-selection process - when preferred targets are hardened
terrorists will seek softer targets like any rational enemy. More
importantly, we cannot harden all potential targets - not even
all high-value targets. 29 Thus, discussing locking cockpit doors
Benjamin Franklin. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to
the Governor, November 11, 1755. 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242
(Leonard W. Labaree, ed., 1963).
There are three ways that we as a society can 'lose' to terrorism -
first, we can fail to provide security and future successful terrorist attacks
could undermine the confidence and optimism required to maintain our
economic and political system, second, we can bankrupt our economy by
incurring defense costs not appropriately apportioned to actual risk or by
imposing security burdens that undermine its competitiveness, see note 29
infra, or, third, we can create a totalitarian society no longer worth
maintaining. See generally K. A. Taipale, Losing the War on Terror, Center
for Advanced Studies (forthcoming Winter 2005), on file with the author
[hereinafter, Taipale, Losing the War].
26 Id.
27 But see id., arguing in part that better managing the effects
of globalization on local economies, investing foreign aid in human rights,
women's equality, secular education and family planning, and developing a
rational and sustainable energy policy are fundamental steps to achieving a
long-term solution. See also JOSEPH S. NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO
SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (2004); ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE CHOICE:
GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP (2004); THE BATTLE FOR HEARTS
AND MINDS: USING SOFT POWER TO UNDERMINE TERRORIST NETWORKS
(Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed. 2003).
28 Target hardening refers to defensive strategies such as
employing guards or physical barriers to make it more difficult for terrorists
to act against a specific target. See White House, National Strategy for
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003)
("protecting our critical infrastructures and key assets from physical attack")
available at http :i/www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/ihysical.html.
29 "The nation could never sufficiently harden all potential
targets against attack." Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 1. Indeed,
we stand a good chance of bankrupting our economy by engaging in a
vulnerability-based, rather than threat-based, defensive strategy in which all
possible targets are protected for political reasons rather than concentrating
resources on the most likely targets or threats. See Taipale, Losing the War,
supra note 25. Cf Bin Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt US., CNN.COM (Nov. 1,
132 2004-2005
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is not an "alternative strategy" to employing information
technology as some have implied,30 rather physical defense is a
discrete strategy that needs to be considered on its own merits.
Which brings us to the third strategy - that is, we must identify
terrorists and preempt terrorist acts. 31 To do this requires in
part the better use of information and the better use of advanced
information technology to share relevant information and to
help sort relevant from irrelevant information. 32
This article concerns itself with the use of advanced
information technologies in support of this third strategy. Thus,
this article assumes that there is some category of malicious
actor - terrorist, if you will - for which there exists a political
consensus for proactive investigative strategies intended to
prevent future acts of terrorism. The one conclusion that seems
clear from the report of the Congressional Joint Committee
looking into 9/11 is "that terrorism cannot be treated as a
reactive law enforcement issue, in which we wait until after the
2004) availahle at http://www.cnn.com/204/WORLD/meast/I1/ 1/
binladen.tape/index.html ("We are continuing this policy in bleeding America
to the point of bankruptcy," statement attributed to Osama bin Laden).
Further, the issue of cost is particularly relevant in homeland
security (as contrasted with national security generally) given that
approximately 85% of critical infrastructure to be protected is in the private
sector. See Richard Rector, Infotech and the Law. Homeland security -- Who
pays for protecting infrastructure? 17 WASH. TECH. (Mar. 10, 2003) available
at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/i17 23/federal/20234-1.html.
The cost of infrastructure protection is essentially a "security tax" burden
imposed throughout the economy. See Taipale, Losing the War, supra note
25; see also Kenneth Rogoff, The Cost of Living Dangerously. Can the Global
Economy Absorb the Expenses of Fighting Terrorism? FOREIGN POLICY at 70
(Nov./Dec. 2004).
Further, there is a significant cost to functionality of the system
itself- that is, the friction imposed by various security measures on the free
flow of commerce, capital, talent, and ideas, for example, impeding air travel
or the shipment of goods through the use of physical searches, impeding the
free flow of capital through anti-money laundering requirements, making the
bureaucratic cost of obtaining a student visa prohibitive resulting in a dearth
of graduate student research assistance, or removing from the public domain
essential scientific information, etc. - all of which can undermine our long-
term competitiveness.
30 See, e.g., Laura W. Murphy, ACLU, Remarks at the National
Press Club, Washington, DC (Aug. 25, 2003) available at
http:i/wwwacluorgSafeandFreeiSafeandFree cfm?ID=13355.
31 See, e.g., note 19 supra.
32 See Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 11 (need to
enhance the government's "ability to discern indicators of terrorist activity
amid overwhelming amounts of information").
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bad guys pull the trigger before we stop them."33  But,
reconciling the need for preventative strategies with traditional
notions of due process and individual freedom is a complex task.
It is also important to recognize that technology alone
cannot provide security; at best - and even then only if used
within appropriately designed security systems - it can help
better allocate scarce security resources towards more effective
uses. 34 There is no technological silver bullet that will provide
absolute security nor is there any technical solution that will
absolutely protect privacy.35 Technology alone is not a solution
to either problem; but neither are simple laws prohibiting the
use of specific technologies or particular techniques the answer
in themselves. 36  Instead, some complex system - a social
construction 37 - combining organizational structures, rules and
33 See Editorial, The Limits of Hindsight, WALL ST. J., July 28,
2003, at A10 (responding to the release of the Joint Inquiry Report, supra
note 22).
34 Cf Taipale, supra note 13, at 21.
35 Recognizing that no system - technical or not - can provide
absolute security or absolute privacy also means that no technical system or
technology ought to be burdened with meeting an impossible standard for
perfection, especially prior to research and development. Technology is a tool
and as such it should be evaluated by its ability to either improve a process
over existing or alternative means or not. Opposition to research programs
on the basis that the technologies "might not work" is an example of what has
been called the "zero defect" culture of punishing failure, a policy that stifles
bold and creative ideas. At least one commentator has characterized such
opposition to risk-taking as "downright un-American." See, e.g., David
Ignatius, Back in the Safe Zone, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at A:19
(discussing the knee-jerk opposition to a "terrorist futures market"). See also
discussion of 'confidence intervals', infra.
36 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.32 (arguing that privacy
protection based on law alone is "brittle" in an engineering sense, that is, any
breach results in catastrophic failure of protections. "If technologies are
developed without privacy protecting features built in but outlawed for law
enforcement or domestic security purposes and then the laws are changed in
the future, for example, in response to a new terrorist attack, the then
existing technologies will not be capable of supporting implementation
policies that provide any privacy protection." Id.); see also, id., at n.28,
describing various recent legislative attempts to outlaw the development or
use of certain technologies, techniques or programs.
37 See generally Wiebe E. Bijker, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND
BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1997); Trevor J.
Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts, in
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. Bijker et
al. eds., 1994) (describing technological development as social construction);
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procedures, and technologies must be developed (or must evolve)
together to ensure that we achieve better security while
protecting privacy and civil liberties. 38
This article examines the conflict between security and
privacy in the context of advanced digital information systems
and their related technical characteristics in order to achieve
some better understanding of potential solutions -
organizational, procedural and technical - to achieving security
while protecting privacy.
IV. FRANKEN-TECH: THE FEAR OF TECHNOLOGY
Cass Sunstein, among others, has written much about the
notion that people act apparently irrationally with regard to
certain risk trade-offs. 39 For example, during the recent DC
sniper episode, citizens of one state would drive to another to get
gas rather than use a local gas station for fear of the sniper -
thus exposing themselves to greater statistical risk of death
from a traffic fatality than from an actual sniper attack. So too,
people who fear flying and prefer to drive may actually expose
themselves to a much greater risk of injury or death on the
highway.4 0
Sunstein identifies three noteworthy points about how
fear impacts risk analysis. 41 The first is that without actual
knowledge of a particular risk, people rely on the availability
38 See, e.g., Second Markle Report, supra note 23 at 8-9
("Building a networked community for Homeland Security.").
39 Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26
JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003), reprinted in THE RISKS OF
TERRORISM (W. Kip Viscusi ed. 2003) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Terrorism], and
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, U. CHICAGO
LAW & ECONOMICS, Olin Working Paper No. 138. (November 2001)
[hereinafter, Sunstein, Emotions] available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=292149. See also, Sunstein, RISK AND REASON
(2002).
Much of Sunstein's work in this area builds on that of Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment under Uncertainty." Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974) [hereinafter Tversky, Judgment under Uncertaintf; JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovac & Amos Tversky, eds., 1982) [hereinafter, KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
40 Cf Jane Brody, Don't Lose Sight of Real, Everyday Risks, N.
Y. TIMES, October 9, 2001, at F6.
41 Sunstein, Terrorism, supra note 39 at 121-122.
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heuristic, through which they assess a risk by reference to
whether a readily available example of the outcome can be
recalled, 42 that is, people exhibit a greater fear of a risk the more
they are reminded of actual or similar outcomes. The second is
that people generally show a disproportionate fear of risks that
are either unfamiliar or appear hard to control, 43 that is, people
exhibit a greater fear of a risk from an unfamiliar or novel
source even if its probability is slight. And, the third is that
people are prone to what Sunstein calls probability neglect-
that is, in the face of risks with high emotional content, emotion
plays a significant role in obscuring 'rational' choice. 44
These three impacts are also observed in policy choice.
Sunstein has documented many instances in which media
attention to a particular environmental issue, for example, Love
Canal, Alar, or asbestos in schools, has resulted in 'irrational'
policy choices not grounded in objective assessments of relative
risk.45  In these instances the media focus essentially
determines the emotional state of the polity.46 Further, the
media attention itself is often manipulated by what Sunstein
calls "availability entrepreneurs" who take advantage of a
particular event to publicize (and thus elevate) a relatively
unlikely risk in order to further their own particular agenda.47
Thus, the public debate on policy issues - particularly on
complex issues or novel problems with unknown consequences -
is often dominated by these information entrepreneurs,
including activists and the media itself, who attempt to
engender information cascades to further their own particular
agenda. 48 "An [information] cascade is a self-reinforcing process
42 Id. The availability heuristic was first described by
Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 39.
43 Sunstein, Terrorism, supra note 39 at 121, citing P. SLOVAC,
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000).
44 "Sometimes people focus on the worst possible case, which
triggers strong emotions. When this is so, people fail to inquire into the
probability that the worst case will occur. In such cases, emotions lead to
what I will call probability neglect." Sunstein, Emotions, supra note 39, at 4.
45 Id. at 18-21.
46 See generally Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691-98
(1999).
47 See generally SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 39, at
78-98 ("Chapter 4: This Month's Risk").
48 I do not mean to imply that these actors are not justified in
their concerns, only that their particular focus comes to dominate the
information flow and their rhetoric sets the terms of the debate.
136 2004-2005
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of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception
triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing
plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse."49
The result is often that relatively minor risks can be overblown
causing a high level of social anxiety, the expenditure or
misallocation of significant resources, and the imposition of
costly regulation in situations where other risks, of greater
magnitude, are ignored.5
0
This same phenomenon skews the public debate on
technology, security and privacy. The availability of information
privacy horror stories (in particular, the prevalence of identity
theft, spam and hacker stories in the media), 51 and the general
mistrust in government agencies to handle personal information
appropriately, 5 2 combined with a general apprehension about
technology 53 and how it works, 54 and the natural anxiety
relating to disclosure of personal, particularly intimate,
information - all spurred on by the privacy lobby5 5 - has created
49 Kuran and Sunstein, supra note 46 at 684.
50 Compare, for example, Alar with tobacco. See generally,
Kuran and Sunstein, id. at 683-768; SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note
39 at 78-98.
51 Although these risks have little to do directly with policies
relating to government access to data, their prevalence in the public
conscience tends to add to the general apprehension about control of personal
information in a networked environment.
52 See, e.g., Eric J. Sinrod, Do you trust Big Brother with your
personal information? USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2004, available at
http:i/www.usatoday.com/techicolumnist/ericsinrod/2OO4-O2-O5-
sinrod x.htm.
53 See generally LEWIS MUMFORD, MYTH OF THE MACHINE:
TECHNICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1963, 1934); JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE
SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY (1993); TECHNOLOGY, PESSIMISM,
AND POSTMODERNISM (Yaron Ezrahi, et a]., eds. 1994); but cf, e.g., GEORGE
GILDER, TELECOSM (2000) (exhibiting an exuberant optimism in a technology
determined future).
54 Cf Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at n.6 ("Even among computer
professionals there is substantial misunderstanding ... [but] those with the
seeming greater familiarity with the technology are less apocalyptic in their
reactions.").
55 By privacy lobby I mean those individuals or institutions
whose political raison d'etre (and fundraising) is, at least in part, shaped,
driven or determined by the privacy issue. The privacy lobby includes both
civil libertarians on the left and libertarians on the right. See, e.g., Barr to
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a public anxiety about electronic privacy 56 out of proportion to
the actual privacy risks and has obscured discussion of the very
real threats posed by either failing to provide security or by
misallocating security resources. 57
Anecdotal support for the notion that there is an
unreasonable fear based on unfamiliarity with the technology
underlying the public debate on privacy can be found by drawing
an analogy with early concerns about the use of credit cards
online. While people do not think twice now about using their
credit cards online, there was much consternation in the late
1990s when even the long-term success of online commerce was
questioned based on the unwillingness of consumers to use
credit cards online - a fear wholly out of proportion to the actual
risk and one that never entered their minds when they handed
over their card to a minimum wage busboy or threw their credit
card receipt in a public trash receptacle. Some would argue that
the overblown concern for electronic privacy may be the 'risk of
the moment' based in part on a lack of awareness or
understanding of the nature and consequences of current
technology developments 58 and the novelty of the threat.
While some might argue that the government has used
the fear of terrorism (the actual threat to any particular
56 See, e.g., America's Number One Fear In The 21st Century Is
Loss Of Personal Privacy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999 at 18A.
57 See Heather MacDonald, Total Misrepresentation, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Jan. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.comiContent/PubliciArticles/000/000/002i
137dvufs.asp?pg=2 ("[critics of initiatives to improve intelligence] barely
mention the motivation for the initiative, if at all. [They write] ... without
once referring to terrorism or the 9/11 strikes.")
58 Cf comments by Kevin Ryan, CEO of DoubleClick, at the
Reuters Technology Media and Telecommunications Summit (Feb. 24, 2004)
as reported by Reuters (Feb. 25, 2004):
Ryan suggested that privacy concerns have eased over the
years, similar to how many people have relaxed about using
their credit cards online. While people don't think twice now
about using their credit cards for online purchases, polls
showed that Internet users in the late 1990s were more afraid
of fraud, he said.
"I said the same thing many, many years ago, that I
thought privacy concerns would follow the credit card fraud
concerns," he said. "What happened was the actual risk
wasn't that great. In fact, people started to realize that
nothing is 100 percent safe ever."
138 2004-2005
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individual from terrorism, even in 2001, was a relatively low
probability risk) to push policies without adequate public
debate, 59 so too, others could argue that the "privacy lobby" has
used fear of electronic privacy intrusion - wholly
disproportionate to its actual injury or risk to civil liberty - to
oppose technological developments and further their own
agenda. 60
V. THE PRIVACY NORM PROSELYTIZERS: A FETISH FOR
SECRECY
A significant problem in determining policy in this area is
that privacy means different things to different people. 61 It is
beyond the scope of this article to definitely define privacy or
reconcile competing views.62  However, much of the public
debate about the use of technology seems to take place within an
unexamined mythology of privacy - a mythology that conflates
privacy with absolute secrecy on the one hand and the
maintenance of absolute secrecy with liberty on the other. But,
this deified notion of privacy based on absolute secrecy - that is,
keeping others from knowing what we are doing by emphasizing
concealment 63 - confounds two simpler ideas: knowing what
someone does (behavior) and knowing who someone is (identity).
Further, it is based on a presumed privacy entitlement for
59 See, e.g., Albert Gore, Remarks to moveon.org (November 9,
2003) at http://www.moveon.org/gore/speech.html
60 See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, What We Don't Know Can
Hurt Us, 14 CITY JOURNAL (Spring 2004) available at http://www.city-
journal.org/html/14 2 what we dont know.html.
61 "Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings,
that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all." Robert
C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001); "Perhaps
the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to
have any very clear idea what it is." Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to
Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295-314 (1975).
62 See Taipale, supra note 13, at 50-57 (for an overview of
competing views).
63 Cf Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (critiquing the
Supreme Court's conceptualization of privacy premised on "a form of total
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electronic data that exceeds that afforded paper-based records or
real-world experience. 64
This perception of a privacy entitlement arose not by
accident or necessity, but from the intentional action of what
Steven Hetcher calls norm proselytizers (what I refer to as the
privacy lobby and Sunstein might call availability
entrepreneurs) who have an interest in promoting online
privacy.65 Nevertheless, it is not my intention to minimize the
privacy interests at stake here.6 6 Quite the contrary, I argue
that we should insist on value sensitive development strategies
that build in technical constraints; that we subject the
development and use of these technologies to strict
authorization, oversight, and judicial review; and that we use
advanced technical means to "watch the watchers" to prevent
abuse or misuse.
However, we face one of two inevitable futures - one in
which technologies are developed with privacy protecting values
and functions built into the design or one in which we rely solely
on legal mechanisms and sanctions to control the use of
technologies that have been developed without regard to such
protections. 67 In my view, it is the fetish for absolute secrecy
64 See, for example, the recent opposition on 'privacy' grounds by
many of the leading self-styled 'privacy groups' to Gmail, a free, web-based
email service offered by Google in which users consent to having their email
scanned automatically so that topic-relevant ads can be served. "Privacy
fundamentalists ... insist that new services they believe to be harmful should
be banned, even if consumers are clamoring for them." Declan McCullagh,
Gmail and Its Discontents, NEWS.COM (April 26, 2004) available at
http :i/news.com.com/2010- 1032-5199224.html.
65 Steven Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy
Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. REV. 877 (2001).
66 Indeed, I agree with Marc Rotenberg, "Privacy will be to the
information economy of the next century what consumer protection and
environmental concerns have been to the industrial society of the 20th
century." James Gleick, Big Brother is Us, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (September
29, 1996). Marc Rotenberg is the executive director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), a leader of the anti-Gmail lobby, see note 64
supra.
67 Taipale, supra note 13, at 12. There is no realistic scenario
under which the development of these technologies is simply halted. The
emergence of digital technology has changed certain underlying base
conditions to information management. First, the cost of data retention is
less than the cost of selective deletion, and, second, the cost of indiscriminate
data collection is less than the cost of selective acquisition. Therefore, in
general, more data will be collected and retained throughout the information
economy. To manage these vast data volumes with the same or fewer
140 2004-2005
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promulgated by the privacy lobby that precludes or delays the
development of appropriate technologies to improve security
while also protecting civil liberties, and leaves us with little
security and brittle privacy protection.
Thus, for example, I have previously argued that last
year's defunding by Congress of DARPA's Information
Awareness Office (IAO) and its Terrorism Information
Awareness (TIA) program and related projects 68 was a pyrrhic
victory for civil liberties as that program provided a focused
opportunity around which to publicly debate the rules and
procedures for the future use of these technologies and, most
importantly, to oversee the development of the appropriate
technical features required to support any concurred upon
implementation or oversight policies to protect privacy.6 9
In any case, privacy (particularly any legal or moral claim
for the protection of privacy) should be based on the need to
protect individual political and personal autonomy, not simply
as a characteristic of data for its own sake.70 Thus, a fetish for
absolute secrecy of innocuous data (or voluntarily produced
analytical resources means that technologies to automate or augment these
processes will be developed. Thus, the question is under what circumstances
and by whom they will be developed and used. In my view, the choice is
between open government research and deployment according to established
norms of due process, or classified government and proprietary commercial
programs not subject to traditional controls.
68 DARPA is the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency.
IAO was the program office for TIA and related projects. TIA was the
systems level project to integrate various advanced information technologies,
including language translation, data aggregation and data analysis, and
others into a "counterterrorism information architecture" in order "to better
detect, classify, and identify potential foreign terrorists." See fAO Report to
Congress regarding the Terrorism Information A wareness Program at 3 (May
20, 2003) in response to Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, No.
108-7, Division M, §111(b) [signed Feb. 20, 2003] [hereinafter IAO Report].
For a more detailed discussion, including a description of the various IAO
projects, see Taipale, supra note 13, at 35-50. The JAO and TIA program
were defunded by Congress in October 2003. See id. at n.28; see also Carl
Hulse, Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2003, at A20.
69 Taipale, supra note 13, at 48-50 (defunding TIA has resulted
in research moving into classified or commercial programs not subject to
public oversight).
70 See Mark Alfino & G. Randolph Mayes, Reconstructing the
Right to Privacy, 29 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 1-18 (2003) (arguing privacy is
a moral right of the individual to protect autonomy and distinguishing
theories based on maintaining informational privacy).
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data) that results in alternative intrusions or harms - say a
physical search at the airport (or physical harm from lack of
security) - is suspect and should be questioned. 71
Additionally, the brittle nature of privacy protection
based solely on law needs to be considered. 72 If technologies are
developed without privacy protecting features built in but
outlawed for law enforcement or domestic security purposes,
those laws can be changed in the future in response to a new
terrorist attack, and the then existing technologies will not be
capable of supporting implementation policies that provide any
privacy protection at all.73
Post hoc analyses of the events of 9/11 have revealed that
much relevant information existed but intelligence agencies and
law enforcement were unable to "connect the dots."74 It would
be an unusual polity that now demanded accountability from its
representatives for being unable to connect the dots from
existing datasets to prevent terrorist acts 75 yet denied them the
available tools to do so, particularly if there were to be another
catastrophic event.
Thus, simple opposition to government research projects
or outlawing the use of particular technologies or techniques
seems a second-best - and ultimately futile - strategy; one that
leaves us dependent on classified programs or proprietary
71 Cf Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberties and the Response to
Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 715 (2004) (discussing the trade offs between
electronic data disclosure and physical body searches). See also Maureen
Dowd, Hiding Breast Bombs, N. Y. TIMES Op-Ed, Nov. 25, 2004, at 35; Joe
Sharkey, Another Shoe Drops on the Subject of Airport Security, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2004, at 9. (both discussing physical abuse by TSA airport
screeners).
Also, note the opposition by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) to the voluntary participation in the "registered traveler"
program being tested by the Transportation Security Administration. See
EPIC Alert 11:13, July 12, 2004 at
http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC Alert 11.13.html; Privacy Act Notice,
Transportation Safety Administration, Docket No. TSA-2004-17982, June 1,
2004.
72 Here I mean privacy protection that is brittle in an
engineering sense - that is, any breach results in catastrophic failure.
73 Taipale, supra note 13, at n.32.
74 See, e.g., First Markle Report, supra note 21 at 28,
Illustration 2; see also Taipale, supra note 13, at n.3; see generally the
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commercial interests to develop security technologies 76 and laws
alone to protect privacy. A more effective strategy for the
protection of privacy and civil liberties while improving security
is to build in technical features that support those values in the
first place.
The early Luddites resisted the introduction of technology
by smashing frames, and they were imprisoned or shipped off to
Australia accomplishing little; later movements in their name
adapted to the introduction of new technologies by forming
organizational structures - the precursors to the modern labor
union - and procedures - collective bargaining - to control the
terms under which new technology was to be developed and
deployed. Perhaps there is a lesson for privacy advocates to be
learned from King Ludd. 77
VI. PRIVACY INTERESTS AT STAKE
There can be no doubt that vital privacy interests are at
stake. We must preserve the general culture of freedom in
America 78 and do everything in our power to maintain, improve
76 Another problem with defunding government research,
particularly DARPA projects, is that government research in these areas
tends to be customer- or solution-driven (that is, specifically developed to
solve intelligence and law enforcement needs), whereas commercial research
tends to be vendor-driven (that is, product is developed that meets vendor
needs). See Taipale, Losing the War, supra note 25.
Further, unrealistic restrictions on government access to information
or use of technologies for legitimate needs will result in the further
"outsourcing" of government information needs to the private sector with the
result of less public oversight or controls. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow, Jr.,
Bahamas Firm Screens Personal Data to Assess Risk: Operation Avoids U.
Privacy Rules, WASH. POST A:01 (Oct. 16, 2004); Eric Lichtblau, Homeland
Security Department Experiments with New Tool to Track Financial Crime,
N. Y. TIMES A:48 (Dec. 12, 2004).
77 See generally Thomis, supra note 3; Sale, supra note 3.
78 See generally Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (J.
Brandeis, dissenting):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings, and of his intellect . . . .They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone . . . .To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of
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and protect it59 Individual freedom is the basis on which our
country was founded and its incorporated values stand at the
core of our Constitution and Bill of Rights. 80 Thus, we must
stand ever vigilant to potential dangers to our civil liberties.8
1
Nevertheless, rights incur responsibilities.8 2 Security and
liberty are dual obligations and we cannot slight one for the
other.8 3 It should be remembered that the Fourth Amendment
implicitly recognizes this duality because - in the words of
Amitai Etzioni - the "prohibition on unreasonable searches is
not accorded more weight than the permission to conduct
reasonable searches."8 4 In past crises, particularly when they
have threatened national security, many have been willing to
sacrifice civil liberties in the short-term in order to meet the
particular emergency or challenge.85  In many cases, we as a
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (J. Brennan,
dissenting) (in considering whether government surveillance is reasonable,
the Court needs to consider whether "the amount of freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with a free and open
society.")
79 See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET AL., THE FEDERALIST
(Benjamin Wright ed., 1961). But eL FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF
FREEDOM (2003) (arguing that democracy and freedom are in tension and
that the American model of democracy may not have universal applicability.)
80 Freedom must be preserved for practical reasons as well as to
maintain these noble traditions because it is the foundation of our national
economic and political strength. Freedom for individuals and ideas to
compete with as little governmental interference is what makes our system a
powerful magnet for human development. Imposing unwarranted civil
liberty burdens will make us less competitive in attracting the trade, capital,
and talent that we need to maintain global economic leadership. See Taipale,
Losing the War, supra note 25.
81 See generally THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); and
note 80 supra.
82 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).
83 Powers, supra note 6, at 21.
84 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 206 n.77 (1999).
85 See Rosenzweig, supra note 71, at 667-670 ("The Lessons of
History"). For a more detailed history of these events, see Geoffrey Stone,
Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J.S. CT. HIST. 215 (2003); see also WILLIAM H.
REHNQUEST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998).
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nation later came to regret those actions as having gone too
far.86
In meeting the current challenge of international
terrorism we are confronted with two additional complexities.
First, the 'war on terrorism' may be one with no definable end,
thus we need to develop doctrine and procedures that serve to
protect important values from the outset and that can be
maintained indefinitely. We cannot sustain "emergency
procedures" for any length of time.8 7 Second, we face a threat
from actors who as part of their strategic and tactical doctrine
move among the general population and take advantage of our
open society to mask their own organization and activities.8 8
The task therefore is not to defend against outsiders but to
identify and investigate potentially malicious actors from within
the population without undermining or compromising the
freedom and autonomy of the vast majority of innocent people.
Therefore, neither demonizing a minority nor engendering
suspicion of everyone is a viable or acceptable outcome -
however, neither is undermining legitimate security needs by
deifying absolute secrecy as the only means of protecting
individual autonomy. The particular privacy concerns most
implicated by employing advanced information technologies for
proactive law enforcement activities are primarily three: first,
the chilling effect that information access and data sharing by
government might have on innocent behavior, second, the
slippery slope that may result when powerful tools are used for
increasingly pettier needs until finally we find ourselves
smothered under a veil of constant surveillance, and, third, the
potential for abuse or misuse.
86 Stone, supra note 85, at 215 ("In time of war - or, more
precisely, in time of national crisis - we respond too harshly in our
restrictions of civil liberties, and then, later regret our behavior.")
87 See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 71 at 684 ("The war on
terror, uniquely, is one with no immediate foreseeable end. Thus, excessive
intrusions may not be justified as emergency measures that will lapse upon
the termination of hostilities.")
88 See Staff Statement, supra note 20. Ted Senator, DARPA,
has referred to this as looking for in-liers, rather than out-liers. Center for
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A. THE CHILLING EFFECT
The chilling effect primarily involves the concern that
potential lawful behavior, particularly constitutionally protected
activity, would be inhibited due to the potential for a kind of
post hoc surveillance (often referred to as "dataveillance") that is
said by many to result from the increased sharing of information
among currently discrete sources.8 9
"Potential knowledge is present power," and awareness
that government may analyze activity is likely to alter behavior,
"cpeople act differently if they know their conduct could be
observed."90  The risk is that protected rights of expression,
protest, association, and political participation may be affected
by encouraging "conformity with a perceived norm, discouraging
political dissent, or otherwise altering participation in political
life." 91
Maintaining individual privacy, however, is not
synonymous with being able to commit or plan terrorist acts in
secret without being discovered. Thus, chilling effects-based
arguments against technologies or procedures that can
potentially protect against catastrophic terrorist acts must show
a real privacy impact on legitimate and innocent activity not
just exhibit a fetish for absolute secrecy premised on vague
referrals to potentially inhibited acts.
The Supreme Court requires that chilling-effects based
challenges present more than allegations of a subjective chill; it
requires that such challenges show both actual harm and a
significant effect on protected activities not outweighed by
legitimate government interest. Thus, in Laird v. Tatum,92 the
Court wrote:
89 Roger Clark, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31
COMM. OF THE ACM 498-512 (1988) (coining the term "dataveillance" to
describe how database stores of personal information have facilitated new
surveillance practices); see also Solove, supra note 63, at 1084 (government
access to digital dossiers can chill activities).
90 Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism, The
Report of the [Department of Defense] Technology and Privacy Advisory
Committee at 35 (March 2004) available at
http://www.sainc.com/tapac/finalReport.htm [hereinafter, TAPAC Report].
91 Id. at 35-36.
92 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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In none of these cases, however, did the chilling
effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain
activities or from the individual's concomitant fear
that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and
additional action detrimental to that individual. 93
Although the Court went on to note that it was not
opining on the "propriety or desirability, from a policy
standpoint, of the challenged activities" but merely its
adjudicability, 94 it nevertheless seems appropriate for the policy
debate likewise to require articulation or identification of some
specific harm not outweighed by the compelling government
interest. A vague claim of enforced conformity ought not in
itself, ipso facto, win the argument.
Further, the mere existence of a chilling effect is not alone
sufficient to hold governmental action unconstitutional:
[T]he existence of a "chilling effect," ... has never
been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself,
for prohibiting state action. Where [the state
action] does not directly abridge free speech, but -
while regulating a subject within the State's power
- tends to have the incident effect of inhibiting
First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the
[state action] can be upheld if the effect on speech
is minor in relation to the need for control of the
conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing
SO.
9 5
Thus, chilling effects arguments against the use of
technology should require determining confidence intervals -
that is, the acceptable error rate - for a particular application in
a particular use (i.e., its reasonableness). In the context of
information processing for preemptive law enforcement, the
confidence interval is the net result of false positives and false
negatives, each adjusted for its related consequence and
resource consumption. 96 To analogize to the Court's analysis,
93 Laird, 408 U.S. at 11.
94 Id. at 15.
95 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
96 For a discussion of the relationship between Type 1 errors
(false positives, that is, innocents falsely identified as suspicious) and Type 2
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the adjusted false positive rate equates to the potential for
actual harm to the individual and the adjusted false negative
rate equates to the government interest, in this case, security.
Thus, determining confidence intervals for policy
purposes can be viewed as a function of these two competing
relationships - the number of false positives (innocents
identified) adjusted by the severity of the consequences to the
individual on the one hand and the number of the false
negatives (terrorists not identified) adjusted by the
consequences to security on the other.9 7 If the consequences of a
false positive are relatively low, for example, a bag search at the
airport, and the consequences of a false negative are high, for
example, the plane crashes into the Pentagon, the acceptable
confidence interval for policy purposes should be adjusted (either
technically or by procedures) to bias towards false positives and
reduce false negatives. If, on the other hand, the consequences
to the individual from a false positive are severe, for example
incarceration, and the consequences of false negatives are slight,
for example, a parking ticket scoff-law slips through, then the
confidence interval should be adjusted (either technically or by
policy) to reduce false positives at the risk of increasing false
negatives.
This is not to suggest that there is some perfect
correlation to be calculated among relative risks (which risks
cannot be precisely quantified) but rather to suggest that when
it comes to setting policy, recognizing that appropriate controls
for a particular use will depend on the totality of the
circumstance at the point and time of use - including (as
discussed below) the scope and method of inquiry, the sensitivity
of data, and the particular security interest or threat as well as
the nature of the privacy intrusion - and cannot be rigidly
proscribed or even anticipated. Thus, a perfect system design
would incorporate flexibility in both its policy and technical
controls to allow for changes in circumstances at the point of
use, and its reasonableness would be judged on its use in such
circumstances.
errors (false negatives, that is, terrorists not identified) in the context of the
'war on terrorism', see Rosenzweig, supra note 71, at 677-683.
97 The consequences to security also include the costs associated
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B. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
The slippery slope argument9" is that measures that
might be adopted now for perfectly legitimate national security
concerns might eventually be used in the ordinary course of law
enforcement to investigate and apprehend lesser law breakers
resulting in extraordinary procedures developed to counter a
specific threat becoming the norm - in this case leading to a
permanent and complete surveillance society (a world in which
Michael Froomkin notes "it should be possible to achieve perfect
law enforcement"99).
This fear is particularly relevant when one recognizes
that there will always be an insatiable need for more security 00
and there will always exist a bureaucratic imperative for
additional control. 10 1 There is also the practical consequence of
making tools available - they will be used. For the law
enforcement professional seeking to accomplish their mission we
could expect no less than that they try to take advantage of
every tool or opportunity that is available for each and every
task that they are responsible for. 102 When these three factors -
the need for more security, the imperial bureaucratic drive, and
the practical availability of tools - are combined, the threat of
the slippery slope is real and potentially significant.
Structural implementation options can help ameliorate
these concerns. For example, the data analysis (intelligence)
function could be operationally separated from the law
enforcement function as the Markle Taskforce has suggested. 10 3
The Gilmore Commission has recommended that the Terrorist
98 See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
99 Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1471 (2000). See also infra note 138.
100 One can never be completely safe thus there is always more
that could be done.
101 See generally Matthew Holden, Jr., Imperialism' in
Bureaucracy, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 943 (December 1966).
102 In a similar vein, among the criticisms of the USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-52, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), is that although it was passed
as an anti-terrorism measure it has been used for non-terrorism related
purposes. See, e.g., Bryan Bender, AG Touts Patriot Act; Opponents
Unconvinced, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2004 ("[some Democrats in
Congress] expressed concern that many of the crimes that have been
uncovered via the new powers were not associated with terrorism").
103 First Markle Report, supra note 21 at 2, 22-24
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Threat Integration Center be spun off as an independent agency
to coordinate the domestic intelligence function, 10 4 and I (and
others) have argued that a separate agency with a narrow
charter to process intelligence for domestic security, no
independent law enforcement powers, and subject to strict
oversight should be considered. 10 5 While these organizational
structures do not eliminate concern they can help. Further,
technical architectures to counter the slippery slope also exist.
A distributed architecture with local responsibility and
accountability for data and access, together with strong
credential and audit functions to track usage, 10 6 can provide
protection from a centralized expansion of power or use. 107
C. ABUSE AND MISUSE
Information systems are also open to abuse or misuse.
There are many examples of such misuse - from IRS agents
looking up their neighbor's tax returns108 to law enforcement
officials sharing information with criminal suspects. 10 9 Even
examples of institutionalized abuse, such as the FBI
COINTELPRO, are recent enough to evoke concern. 110 For
104 ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
[the "Gilmore Commission"] FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, Dec. 15, 2003, available
at http ://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.
105 See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Officials Defend Idea of Data
Mining; Experts Weigh Options, NAT'L J.'S TECH. DAILY (Dec. 2, 2003)
(quoting Kim Taipale, "perhaps there is a 'need for a specific intelligence
agency to go after terrorists' with a limited charter"). Compare, however, the
Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terror Act of 2004, approved by the
House on Dec. 7, 2004 and the Senate on Dec. 8, 2004, which centralizes
certain intelligence functions under a new Director of National Intelligence
and waters down certain privacy and civil liberties oversight provisions that
were in the earlier Senate version of the bill, S.2845.
106 See, e.g., the Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 1
(explaining need for a distributed network and arguing "against a centralized
... system.").
107 Taipale, supra note 13, at 42-44.
108 See WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO
DESTROY (1999).
109 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI
Legal Technician Pleads Guilty To Unlawfully Accessing The FBTs Computer
System, (Feb. 26, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/opa/r/2004i
February/04 crm 120.htm.
110 See COINTELPRO (Cathy Perkus, ed. 1976). COINTELPRO
is an acronym for a series of FBI counterintelligence -rograms between 1956-
150 2004-2005
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purposes of policy and technical design, however, the substance
of the concerns need not be resolved - that is, we do not need to
debate whether, for example, the government or its employees
should be trusted to do what is right and not abuse its citizens.
Instead, organizational structures, procedures, and technical
features that function together to limit the potential for abuse
can (and should) be designed and implemented to address these
concerns.
Often neglected in this part of the debate is
acknowledgment that the same characteristics of these
technologies that give rise to some of the privacy concerns in the
first place - the existence of "electronic footprints" in dataspace
- also provide opportunities for resolution or mitigation - that
is, these systems can be turned on themselves to "watch the
watchers." Immutable logging together with strong
credentialing and audit can provide significant deterrent to
abuse making "abuse difficult to achieve and easy to uncover" by
providing secure access control and tamper-resistant evidence of
where data goes and who has had access to it." l '
Additionally, real-time automated monitoring of system
usage and post usage analysis and review, together with
oversight of systems logs, can provide significant checks on both
abuse and misuse. 112 Organizational structures to ensure such
results should also be devised as part of systems
implementations. Thus, for example, determining whether log
files are to be kept locally (and, if so, under whose authority, for
example, by the technical systems administrators, or the
agency's inspector general, general counsel, or privacy officers,
etc.) or externally by oversight bodies is not just a technical
question but also one with substantive policy implications.
1971 through which the FBI carried out domestic intelligence activities
against political dissidents.
111 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 196-197.
112 As a technical matter, it is in these kinds of monitoring
activity that automated analysis has shown the most success. See Taipale,
supra note 13, at n.312.
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D. JOSEPH K. AND THE SEPARATION OF SELF
It may well be that existing metaphors1 13 and doctrines
based on outdated notions of defining the relationship between
an individual and their 'personal' information based on place or
expectation are inadequate to address compelling new
challenges brought by emerging technology to civil liberties.
114
Dan Solove1 15 has suggested that a more appropriate metaphor
for the problem of dataveillance11 6 than Orwell's Big Brother1 17
is Kafka's The Trial.118 The concern is of a "more thoughtless
process of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary error, and
dehumanization, a world where people feel powerless and
vulnerable, without meaningful form of participation in the
113 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE
BY 3-6 (2003) discussing how metaphors not only affect how we communicate
but actually structure our perceptions and understandings from the outset.
To paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the "metaphor is the message." See
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 23-
35 (1964) (McLuhan's iconic phrase "the medium is the message" suggests
that the form of mediation itself gives substantive meaning to the mediated
communication independent of content. So too, then, the metaphor.).
Choice of metaphor has suasive power because metaphor brings to a
new subject an expectation imbued with all the old constraints and formal
bounds that attend that which is being used as metaphor without requiring
rigorous independent justification in the new case. See ANTHONY WILDEN,
THE RULES ARE No GAME 196-221 (1987), and ROMAN JACOBSON AND MORRIS
HALLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF LANGUAGE 90-96 (Reprint second edition 2002,
1956). Metaphor, particularly in legal analysis, can presuppose the outcome,
that is, by saying that this is metaphorically that, old legal doctrines can be
applied to new situations without regard to differences in circumstance. In
argument by analogy, the victory often goes to those who get the audience (or
court) to accept their proffered metaphor. See K. A. Taipale, Free Speech,
Semiosis, and Cyberspace, Center for Advanced Studies in Sci. & Tech. Pol'y
Comment Draft at 6 (Jan. 2003) ("Part II. Metaphors: Is Cyberspace a Place
or Social Condition?") a vailable at
http://ww.taipale.orgpapers/CyberSemiosis.pdf
114 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE AND MARC ROTENBERG,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 275-322 (2003).
115 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2001).
116 See note 89 supra.
117 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) depicts a
totalitarian society of the future, ruled by an omnipotent dictator called Big
Brother. In this society, called Oceania, people's thoughts and actions are
continuously monitored. The term Big Brother has subsequently been used
to refer to any ruler or government that invades the privacy of its citizens.
118 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL: A NEW TRANSLATION BASED ON THE
RESTORED TEXT (Brion Mitchell, tr. 1999) (Joseph K. is arrested, tried and
executed for an unspecified crime).
152 2004-2005
30
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/6
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
collection and use of their information" rather than the more
traditional concern of secrecy or surveillance. 119 In suggesting
Kafka's The Trial as metaphor for the inchoate sense of lost
control that comes from unknown uses of personal information
in vast technological systems, Solove has illustrated an
interesting divide in the theoretical underpinnings of
information privacy premised on "control" of private information
and distinct from the issues raised by traditional concerns of
surveillance. 120
Michael Froomkin has stated that "information privacy [is
used] as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or
release of information about oneself."121  Jeffrey Rosen has
written that a "central value" of such control is to protect
individuals "from being misidentified and judged out of context
in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information
can easily be confused with knowledge." 122 And, Paul Schwartz
has concluded that this process can lead to the "autonomy trap
a reduced sense of the possible." 123
The underlying concern that emerges here seems to be not
so much that government will observe individual behavior (even
after the fact) (i.e., Big Brother) but that it will come to the
wrong conclusion with subsequent unpleasant consequence to
the individual (i.e., The Trial) - that is, the fear is that data
relating to an individual will be mismanaged or misinterpreted
with real-world consequences to that individual. In another era,
this might have been expressed as "do not fold, spindle or
mutilate me (or my data)."124 In The Trial, when the examining
magistrate consults his notes and asks Joseph K. (the
119 Solove, supra note 115, at 1398.
120 See also Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
121 Michael Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1463.
122 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8 (2000).
123 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 815, 825 (2000).
124 The phrase "do not fold, spindle or mutilate," which has
almost disappeared from popular usage but was a cultural icon in the 1960s,
was coined to prevent people from disabling the process of feeding machine
readable computer punch cards into information systems. The phrase itself,
as well as the punch cards to which it referred, became symbols of the
computer, of alienation, and of anxiety about technology generally. See, e.g.,
Steven Luber, Smithsonian Institute, '"o not fold, spindle or mutilate".'A
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protagonist and a bank clerk) whether he is a house painter, K.
rises up to address the proceedings arguing that the very fact
that such a question could be asked undermines the legitimacy
of the proceedings. 125 A more light-hearted but still illustrative
example of this is the now quasi-famous "My TiVo thinks I'm
Gay" article 126 in which the subject finds that because he
recorded a Steve Reeves gladiator movie his TiVo begins
suggesting that he might like shows with a gay theme. 127
A fundamental issue, as yet not fully resolved to
everyone's satisfaction in the context of emerging technologies,
is whether data about an individual (whether disclosed by that
individual or otherwise obtained) should "belong" to that
individual in any kind of sense that would invoke legal
mechanisms of ongoing control - i.e., some notion of property 128
- or perhaps even a renewal of "expectations" of privacy for
secondary uses 129 - after it shared or otherwise becomes known.
125 Kafka, supra note 118, at 44-47. ("Your question, your honor,
about me being a house painter - and you weren't really asking at all, you
were telling me outright - is characteristic of the way these entire
proceedings against me are being conducted." Id. at 45.)
126 Jeffrey Zaslow, If TiVo Thinks You are Gay, Here's How to
Set it Straight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002 at 1.
127 TiVo is a network enabled digital recording service through
which subscribers can digitally record television programming from multiple
delivery sources (satellite, cable, broadcast, etc.). Among the TiVo features is
one that suggests additional programming that the user might be interested
in based on an analysis of past recordings by that individual. Cf the
amazon.com service described in note 202 infra.
128 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual
Property?52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) ("some American commentators
have proposed that the law should grant individuals a property right in their
personal data"); Jessica Littman, Information Privacy/Information Property,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (2000) ("People should own information about
themselves and, as owners of property, should be entitled to control what is
done with it. [citing Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246-94 (1998)]. This essay explores
that proposal."); cf Julie E. Cohen, supra note 120, at 1377-1391
("Conventional understandings of ownership, liberty, and expression do not
easily stretch to accommodate informational privacy rights." Id. at 1375); see
also Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC. RES. 247, 247 and n.1
(2002) ("In my view, we would better support privacy within American society
if we spoke of privacy as a kind of property. Property talk, in other words,
would strengthen the rhetorical force behind privacy").
129 Cf, e.g., the "Fair Information Practices" (as first set forth in
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Records, Computers and
the Rights of Citizens (1973) [hereinafter HEW Report]; see also OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; Information Infrastructure Task
154 2004-2005
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Although the general legal rule is well established that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from
obtaining information that was voluntarily given to a third
party and then conveyed by that party to government
authorities because there can be no reasonable "expectation of
privacy" for such already shared information1 30 this issue
continues to be subject to ongoing legal, policy and philosophical
debate. 131 In particular, the question has been raised whether
this 'third party rule' continues to be appropriate in the
Information Age in which vast amounts of personal information
is maintained by third parties in private sector databases, and
the very nature of the medium requires that data be shared
Force, Information Policy Committee, Privacy Working Group, Privacy and
the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using
Personal Information (1995) [hereinafter IITF Report]; U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Privacy and the Nil." Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related
Personal Information (1995); The European Union Directive on the
Protection of Personal Data (1995) [hereinafter EUDirective];) that explicitly
state that the corollary to identifying the purposes for data collection (i.e., the
notice requirement) is that the data not be used for other or subsequent
purposes without the data subject's consent. See HEW Report at 61-62;
OECD Guidelines, Use Limitation Principle and para. 10; IITFReport § JJ.D;
EUDirective arts. 6-7.
130 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-443 (1976)
(financial records); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (pen
register).
131 In particular, the notion whether privacy should include a
legal right to ongoing control of information about oneself after others know
it, that is, to manage one's own reputation, is controverted. Compare, e.g.,
Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 122, at 8 (where Rosen argues that a "central
value of privacy" is to protect individuals "from being misidentified and
judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which
information can easily be confused with knowledge") and Andrew E. Taslitz,
The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century.* Technology, Privacy,
and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128 (2002) ("we want to
choose the masks that we show to others") with Richard A. Posner, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 232-42 (1983) (arguing from an economic perspective
that the individual want for privacy stems from a desire "to manipulate the
world . . . by selective disclosure of facts . . . [in order] to mislead those with
whom [the individual] transacts" and is therefore economically and socially
inefficient.) See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy. The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking
aboutyou. 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); cf the references in note 128 supra.
Whether "public" information is entitled to expectations of privacy,
see Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The
Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998); Taslitz, supra, at
text accompanying n.289 ("We do not shed all privacy expectations simply
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with, maintained by, or exposed to such third parties. 132 This
question does not need to be resolved here.
Instead, to pick up on Solove's Trial metaphor, the
concern as it relates to individual autonomy seems not so much
about control of data but, rather, the consequences (or potential
consequences) of error. Thus, to some extent this Kafkaesque
concern is ameliorable through the same mechanisms as the
chilling effect argument - that is, there is a direct relationship
between the reasonableness of the action to the efficacy or
confidence interval (error rate) of the process and its error
correction procedures. It is, after all, the need for error
correction through due process that is the underlying theme of
The Trial, not secrecy of data.
According to Theodore Ziolkowski, 133 Kafka's subtle
critique of the clash between traditional and modern law134 in
The Trial is exemplified by a system in which accusation is the
same as guilt and leads to execution without the ability of the
accused to get a hearing in a higher court:
[A] system in which the preliminary investigation has
displaced the other stages of the procedure with its
guaranteed protection for the rights of the individual.
The preliminary investigation, in turn, goes to the
extreme in ignoring the objective facts of the case and
132 See Solove, supra note 63, at 1085-1086:
The Court, however, has held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in records maintained by third parties.
... Thus, there is a profoundly inadequate legal response to
the emerging problem of government access to aggregations of
data, "digital dossiers" [held by third parties] that are
increasingly becoming digital biographies.
Solove goes on to conclude that "A new architecture of power must be
constructed, one that effectively regulates the government's collection and
use of third party records." Id. at 1167. See also discussion of 'scope of
access' infra.
133 THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICE 233-240
(1997).
134 According to Ziolkowski, id. at 236-238, Kafka is in part
motivated by the perceived clash between traditional notions of law - based
on guilt - and modern notions - based on violation of rules - as exemplified
in differences between the German and Austrian penal codes with which
Kafka was familiar. Cf STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
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focusing on the guilt of the accused. ... [T]he system moves
from inquiry to execution without defense, trial, or
notification. 135
The lesson that I draw from Solove's metaphor is not that
a fetish for absolute secrecy is needed to address these concerns
but rather an insistence on procedural protections - that is,
requiring a system that is designed with organizational,
procedural, and technical features that allow due process
mechanisms to function, and that recognizes the potential for
error and provides mechanisms for its correction. 136
Thus, technological systems should conform to existing (or
evolving) notions of due process and technical features and
implementations should be designed to support those
procedures. 137 As additional protection, information processing
technologies should be used only as investigative tools - that is,
to allocate law enforcement resources - not for evidentiary
purposes. 138 Further, the result of automated processing should
135 Ziolkowski, supra note 133, at 239-240.
136 The importance of error correction procedures as fundamental
to privacy protection is also highlighted by its explicit incorporation in the
Fair Information Practices in the HEWReport, supra note 129, at 41, 59, 63,
OECD Guidelines, supra note 129, at para. 13; and EUDirective, supra note
129, at art. 12. See also Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") §§ 609-11, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681g-1681i (providing for consumer access to, and the right to
correct inaccuracies in, consumer credit reports).
137 With respect to system design, note that Solove calls for a
new "architecture of power" to address inadequacies in current doctrine.
Solove, supra note 63, at 1151-1167. This Article argues that technical
system architecture itself can and should be developed concurrently with the
development of any such policy or legal structure. See also Neal Kumar
Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1047 (2002)
[hereinafter, Katyal, Architecture] (discussing the use of physical
architecture - structural and space design - as an effective alternative form
of crime control; design mechanisms discussed include: (1) creating
opportunities for surveillance, (2) instilling a sense of territoriality, (3)
building community and avoiding isolation, and (4) protecting targets); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261
(2003) [hereinafter, Katyal, Digital Architecture] (applying these four
principles of realspace architecture design to the problem of security in
cyberspace); K. A. Taipale, Internet and Computer Crime: System
Architecture as Crime Control, Center for Advanced Studies (Feb. 2003).
138 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.56. Cf the increasing use of
automated traffic-surveillance camera systems to issue traffic tickets without
human review, see, e.g., William Matthews, Battle Lines Form over Red
Light Cameras, FCW.com, Sep. 3, 2001, at
http://www.fcw.com/geb/articlesi200 1/sep/geb-comm2 -09 -01.asp.
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be subject to human review before triggering adverse individual
consequences. 139  Finally, large-scale technical systems or
applications with significant privacy implications should be
subject to programmatic authorization prior to
Note also the potential outcome if automated analysis of ubiquitous
data becomes the norm and is taken to its logical extreme:
Ultimately, if data is collected on everyone's location and on
all transactions, it should be possible to achieve perfect law
enforcement, a world in which no transgression goes
undetected and, perhaps, unpunished. At that point, the
assumptions of imperfect detection, the need for deterrence,
and the reliance on police and prosecutorial discretion on
which our legal system is based will come under sever strain.
Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1470-1471.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address this issue in any
depth, however, I have argued elsewhere, see, e.g. K. A. Taipale, Technology,
Security and Privacy. Rethinking the Problem Statement, Presentation at In
Search of J. Doe: Can Anonymity Survive in Post-911 Society Conference,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, at slide 21 (May 4, 2004)
available at http://www.taipale.org/presentations/CAS-WWICS.htm, that
such a system, based on perfect law enforcement through ubiquitous control
technologies, is more akin to a Pigovian tax system, see generally ARTHUR
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (2002, 1920), for social control than a
traditional Beccarian criminal justice model, see generally, CESARE
BECCARIA: ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans. 1963, 1764),
and will require rethinking what is criminalized.
By analogy, for purposes of this Article, privacy - if we define it as
autonomy - can also be protected by changing the consequences of disclosure
(i.e., by lessening its affect on autonomy). See generally DAVID BRIN, THE
TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998).
On the general issue of social control through systems design, see
generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON (1971); JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE
COMPUTER STATE (1983); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1995); OSCAR H. GANDY, THE PANOPTICON SORT: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993); GARY T. MARX,
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988); see also Katyal,
Architecture, supra note 137; Katyal, Digital Architecture, supra note 137;
Taipale, supra note 137.
139 The European Union proposes a right to have human
checking of adverse computer, generated results. See EU Directive, supra
note 129, at art. 15:
Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be
subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning
him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on
automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain
personal aspects relating to him ....
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implementation, 140 oversight during use, and judicial review in
accordance with existing (or evolving) due process doctrines and
practices after the fact of use. 14 1
The purpose of this article is not to minimize these
privacy concerns, rather it is to illustrate where they have
applicability in practice and where appropriate procedures or
technological development strategies can help ameliorate
concerns by allowing familiar mechanisms to operate.
VII. THE TECHNOLOGIES
The kinds of technologies with which this article is
concerned can be classified broadly as three types:
technologies of identification,
technologies of data aggregation and automated
analysis, 142 and
technologies of collection.
The purpose of this article is not to detail technical
developments in each of these areas in great depth, but rather to
identify certain thematic characteristics that illustrate where
technical solutions and system design can provide intervention
points in the application of these technologies in order for
familiar due process procedures and related mechanisms to
function. Thus, rather than a discussion of particular
technologies this section describes their functional application
and their relationship to security needs. 143 Throughout this
140 For example, as recommended by the TAPAC Report, supra
note 90, at x-xii, for data mining applications.
141 See generally Rosenzweig, supra note 13 (setting out a
proposed legal and procedural framework for implementation of TIA).
142 Including "data mining". See generally Taipale, supra note
13.
143 Aligning information technology requirements and
capabilities with business process needs is core to most current models of
enterprise architecture in the private sector. Enterprise architecture
recognizes that most system design problems are not technology problems but
business process problems and seeks to align information and technical
architecture to support business needs. See generally MELISSA COOK,
BUILDING ENTERPRISE INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE: REENGINEERING
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1996); Federal Enterprise Architecture Management
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article, but particularly in this section, I use the terms system
and securitybroadly and generically. I use system to mean any
bounded system - i.e., national borders, air transportation, a
particular physical location, or a computer network - within
which one wants to provide security. And, I use security to
mean any effort to ensure that 'users' of a system comport to
rules for behavior in that system.
Before discussing the functional aspects of identification
systems it is important to reiterate that the use of any intrusive
technology in any particular application has to be measured not
only against its privacy impact but also its efficacy for meeting
security needs and countering designated threats. If a
particular technology or application is not effective at improving
security it should not be considered for use in the first place. 144
Thus, for example, very high false positive rates for any
screening system are not only intolerable because of their
impact on privacy but are not useful for security as they
misallocate or waste security resources. Also, the need to
collect, maintain or process any particular type of data within a
specific security application needs to be weighed against its
salience for that particular security need. 145
Both the security and privacy effects from any
identification system are derived from the security and privacy
Office, What is Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) at
http ://www.feapmo.gov/fea.asp.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore enterprise
architecture. For purposes of this Article it is sufficient to recognize that
information management and technical systems architectures (that is,
systems design) needs to be developed to support the relevant business
processes, in this case, both security and privacy. See also, K. A. Taipale,
Presentation at Counterterrorism Technology and Privacy Conference,
McCormick Tribune Foundation Cantigny Conference Series, ABA Standing
Committee on Law and National Security (June 24-25, 2004) available at
http ://www.taipale.org/resentations/Cantigny-062504.pd.
144 But see note 161 infra and accompanying text (discussing
collateral benefits from "security theater").
145 Admittedly, determining salience for certain types of data
prior to analysis may not be possible (i.e., without attempting to "connect the
dots" one cannot know which dots may or may not be relevant), however,
understanding the relationship of the data need for the particular security
application itself is possible. For example, in any given security context,
what is the purpose for requiring "identification" - to prove that the person
has an ID, to prove that the person is who they say they are, or to prove that
the person is authorized to do something? Each requires a different
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features and design of the overall system in which they are to be
used and are not inherent in the identification technologies
themselves. Obviously, different systems (and different threats)
require different levels of security and will require different
trade-offs to be made between privacy, security and
functionality, 146 however, for analytic purposes in this section,
we discuss functional aspects of security systems generally.
A. TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTIFICATION
Identification technologies or systems serve to
authenticate data attribution - that is, they provide confidence
that a particular piece of data (an attribute) or collection of data
(an identity) correlates with a specified entity (an individual or
other object).147
Authentication generally serves as the first step in one or
both of two kinds of security applications or strategies -
authorization and/or accountability.148  Authorization (or
permission) is the process of deciding what an identified
individual is permitted (or not permitted) to do within a system
(including whether they are allowed access in the first place).
For example, an individual may be authorized to enter a secure
zone, may be denied access to board a plane, or may be given
access to a computer system but constrained from accessing
certain services or information. Accountability, on the other
hand, is the process of associating a consequence to the
individual for any actions that they may take within the system,
for example, by recording identifying information prior to entry
into a system, or by monitoring, recording or logging activity
within the system, to allow for subsequent tracking or sanction.
146 See generally Michael Froomkin, The Uneasy Case for
National ID Cards, [YISP CyberCrime 20041 (2004) (discussing the trade-offs
involved in implementing a national ID card); But ef Richard Sobel, The
Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification Systems, 15
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 319 (2002).
147 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO GOES THERE?
[hereinafter NRC] 16-32 (Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett, eds., 2003).
Much of this section on identification follows the analysis set forth in this
reference.
148 Id. at 337-38.
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Both authorization and accountability serve to ensure that rules
governing behavior within a system are obeyed. 149
From a political point of view, authorization based on
access control strategies are generally associated with
totalitarian systems (i.e., the default state of these systems is
that all users are suspect, the chosen receive permission) and
accountability strategies are associated with freedom (i.e., the
default state is that all users are presumed innocent, only those
who have already done something wrong are sanctioned).150
Unfortunately, accountability strategies are not very effective
against suicidal attackers or situations with catastrophic
outcomes, and, thus, give rise to the difficult policy choices
facing a free society in taking a preemptive, rather than
traditional reactive law enforcement, approach to terrorism.
In any identification system, there are generally three
forms of authentication that can occur:
Entity authentication is the process of establishing
confidence that an identifier, for example, a name,
number or symbol, refers to a specific entity (an
individual, place or thing),151
Identity authentication is the process of
establishing confidence that an identifier refers to
an identity (a collection of data related to an
entity), 152 and
149 Unfortunately, accountability strategies are generally
ineffective against users unconstrained by after-the-fact punishment, for
example, suicide attackers without accountable patrons or other support
infrastructure subject to sanction.
150 Dan Greer, Keynote Address at the Yale Information Society
Project CyberCrime and Digital Law Enforcement Conference (Mar. 27,
2004).
151 NRC, supra note 147, at 19. Entity authentication usually
happens in two phases; first, some identifier is selected (or offered), and
second the identifier is authenticated. In computer security, entity
authentication is generally referred to as "user authentication" and in
biometrics it is generally referred to as "verification". Id.
152 NRC, supra note 147, at 19. Like with entity identification,
first some identifier is selected (or offered), then authenticated, however, the
identity authenticated is not necessarily linkable to a particular individual.
For example, I may allow you to use my AOL account by sharing my
password. You offer the password for access and it is authenticated as
belonging to that account or identity.
162 2004-2005
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Attribute authentication is the process of
establishing confidence that an attribute (a
property associated with an entity, for example, a
physical descriptor or a role, etc.) applies to a
specific entity. 15 3
Individuals (or other entities) may have multiple
identifiers, even within the same systems, for example, name,
social security number, driver's license number, etc. and may
have one or more aliases for each identifier. 154 Note that the
greater the uniqueness of any particular identifier, the greater
the confidence that it applies to a particular individual or
entity. 155
In addition, individuals or entities may also have multiple
identities - that is, multiple discrete sets of related data
defining, for example, a particular role. Any particular
individual might have identities relating to different roles, for
example, as a family member, as a work professional, or as a
community participant, each of which may or may not share
attributes or identifiers.
Entity resolution is the technical process whereby
different identifiers or different identities are resolved
(attributed) to the same entity or individual usually through
analysis of shared attributes. Technical methods for entity
resolution of individuals - that is, confirming that multiple
153 NRC, supra note 147, at 20.
154 Aliases may include derivatives of a related identifier, for
example, Robert, Bob or Bobby; can be related to a particular physical
characteristic, for example, Shorty or Stretch; or can be unrelated, for
example, Spike, Plubius or Lenin. Aliases can be adopted for social (for
example, nicknames), nefarious (for example, criminal aliases) or autonomy-
protecting (for example, a political nom de plume or nom de guerre) reasons.
Aliases can be known to link to a particular identity or not.
155 But note that even a particular identity consisting of a set of
attributes may apply to more than one individual. For example, the identity:
George Bush, U.S. President, Yale graduate, Texas resident - applies to at
least two different individuals. The corollary, of course, is that by combining
independent variable attributes, entity resolution occurs - for example, 43
people fit the US President attribute, hundreds the George Bush attribute,
thousands the Yale graduate attribute, and millions the Texas resident
attribute - yet in combination, these attributes together give a high
confidence that only one of two individuals out of a population of billions is
"identified". See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.128, discussing the use of
ensemble classifiers- that is, multiple independent models- to increase
confidence intervals in pattern-matching applications.
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discrete sets of related data (i.e., different "identities") actually
belong to the same individual - have achieved high success rates
and for some applications are a "solved problem."156 However,
entity resolution of places (or objects) has not been satisfactorily
automated as yet. 15 7  Some form of entity resolution (or other
data normalization) is generally required for automated
analysis, particularly in systems based on anonymization and
pseudonymization described below.158
Identity verification can be achieved through tokens
(something you have), passwords (something you know), or a
data match (something you are).159 The highest level of
confidence combines all three, for example, a token (ID card),
156 Jeff Jonas, Presentation at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Data-mining in the Private Sector (July 23, 2003) (the
"question of resolving identity - that is, ensuring that data all refer to a
single unique individual - is a 'solved problem'.") cited in Rosenzweig, supra
note 13, at n.14; see also Gang Wang, Hsinchun Chen & Homa Atabakhsh,
Automatically Detecting Deceptive Criminal Identities, 47 COMM. OF THE
ACM 71 (March 2004).
157 Resolving the many ways of referencing geographic location in
text - for example, determining that '123 Main Street', 'the corner of
Broadway and Main', and 'the location of the Fist Federal Bank' are
identifiers all describing the same location - is required to bridge the gap
between Geographic Information Systems (GIS) (in which data is tied to
specific coordinates in space) and plain text data, which may refer to location
in any manner. For a discussion of legal issues relating to GIS, see Jeremy
Speich, Comment: The Legal Implications of Geographical Information
Systems (GIS), 11 ALB. L. J. Sci. & TECH. 359 (2001).
158 In order to do anonymous data matching (see discussion infra)
some method of ensuring that variants in input (for example, different
spellings of names) still yield outputs that can be matched. Either all related
data needs to be resolved to one entity prior to processing (entity resolution)
or some form of data normalization needs to be built into the process. Data
normalization uses rules to reduce variants to one input (e.g., Robert, Bob,
Bobby all reduced to ROBERT) or links the output from related inputs (for
example, recognizing the hashes of Robert, Bob, or Bobby as matches); see
also Dempsey, supra note 16, at 7-8 (discussing data standardization).
Indeed, doing any automated processing on data requires some form of data
normalization or transformation to account for errors on input or other 'dirty
data'. See Taipale, supra note 13, at 27.
159 D. E. Raphael & J. R. Young, Automated Personal
Identification, SRI International (1974); National Bureau of Standards,
Evaluation Techniques for Human Identification, FIPSPUB-48 (Apr. 1977),
cited in NRC, supra note 147, at 46.
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requiring a password (PIN), and that contains a data match (for
example, a biometric identifier).160
Confidence in identification depends not only on the
technologies of identification but on the integrity of the process
of enrollment (the issuing and maintaining of tokens, passwords
and the data to be matched), as well as the process of
verification (confirming or verifying identity).161 Even
technologies of identification with very low error rates for
matching (for example, certain biometrics) can be compromised
if the enrolment process is corrupted or if the measurement
process is fooled.
162
Identification technologies can also be classified as
partiipatory, where the person to be identified either cooperates
or engages with the system knowingly, or passive, where the
individual is not required to actively participate in the
identification process. Examples of the former are the use of ID
cards, fingerprint or iris scanners, and passwords, examples of
the latter are face and gait recognition (and other so-called
recognition-at-a-distance technologies), DNA sniffers, and the
like. Passive identification can be either overt or
surreptitious.1 63  Each of these characteristics has obvious
security and privacy implications.
164
Authentication (that is, identification) in a security
system is only the first step and does not provide security
160 Often called three-factor authentication. See, e.g., James
McGuire, The Enterprise Authentication Game, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK,
January 13, 2003, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/storv/20444.html.
161 See, e.g., Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at app. A:
Reliable Identification for Homeland Protection and Collateral Gains.
162 See, e.g., John Leyden, Gummi Bears Defeat Fingerprint
Sensors, THE REGISTER, May 16, 2002 available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2OO2/O5/16/gummi bears defeat fingerprint se
nsors. Obviously, systems need to be designed to ensure that the
appropriate biometric is being measured at verification (as well as to ensure
the integrity of the data against which it is being matched).
163 See David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-enhanced
Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 569-574 (1990) (discussing issues involved in
surreptitious or secret identification or search). Cf also the American Bar
Association Standards on Technologically-Assisted Surveillance §2-9.1
discussing relevant factors to consider in regulating surveillance, including
whether a particular implementation is overt, that is, surveillance of which a
reasonable person should be aware, see also §2-9.3, or covert.) available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjustistandardsitaps blk.html.
164 Id.; see also, NRC, supra note 147, at 55-79.
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against a particular threat on its own. After identity is
authenticated it must be used for some security purpose - either
by authorizing the individual to do or not do something,165 or by
logging or tracking identifying data in some fashion to provide
for later accountability. Thus, any identification system is only
as good as the watch list or other criteria against which the
authenticated identity is compared for authorization 166 or the
deterrent effectiveness of the sanction for accountability. 16 7
165 Another complexity in designing identification based systems
for security is that a particular authorization may "belong" to an entity, an
identifier, or an identity - and in each case may vary by context. For
example, an individual may be authorized to do something by virtue of their
individual relationship (e.g., as spouse or parent), by virtue of a token (e.g.,
possession of bearer bonds, hall pass, bathroom key, etc.), or by virtue of their
identity in context (e.g., the right of a police officer to carry a firearm while on
duty or for a baggage handler to enter a secure area). That authorizations
may relate to context creates potential weaknesses in access systems that do
not distinguish, for example, whether an individual is on-duty or off-duty
upon identification.
166 Problems with government "watch lists" in the war on
terrorism are well documented. These problems include the difficulty of
integrating multiple lists, see, e.g., John Mintz, DHS Blamed for Failure To
Combine Watch Lists, WASH. POST A02 (Oct. 2, 2004); Dibya Sarkar,
Inspector general finds watch list leadership lacking, FCW.cOM (Oct. 4,
2004); Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, DHS Challenges
In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information OIG-04-31 (Aug. 2004); as
well as the problems associated with using non-unique identifiers - i.e.,
common names - for screening purposes, see, e.g., Sara Kehaulani Goo,
Hundreds Report Watch -List Trials, Some Ended Hassles at Airports by
Making Slight Change to Name, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2004, at A08) (also
highlighting the ease with which such systems are defeated, for example, by
using a middle initial). These problems are especially concerning because the
use of watch lists is spreading. See, e.g., Sept. 11 Commission Wants No-Fly'
List for Trains, Ships, FOxNEWS.COM, Sept. 08, 2004 available at
http ://www.foxnews.com/storv0,2933.131820,00.html.
167 Clearly, showing ID to prove that you have an ID to gain
entrance (as is the case in many commercial buildings, for example) is more
"security theater" as some security consultants have called it, than real
security. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 38-40 (2003). Nevertheless, while
security theater is a clever phrase sure to garner press quotes, such measures
- that is, security measures that provide a feeling of security regardless of
whether they actually reduce risks or counter specific threats - can also serve
a beneficial function if they maintain confidence in systems and allow for
normal functioning.
Thus, policy makers must also consider whether making passengers
feel safer is important for maintaining the viability of the economic,
transportation or other systems regardless of whether it actually increases
security against a specific threat. For analytical purposes, policy-makers
need to take an expansive view of security. Security in this broad sense
encompasses maintaining viability of economic, transportation or other
166 2004-2005
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1. IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS AND SECURITY
Identification based security is always somewhat
vulnerable because of what is known as the trusted systems
problem. 168 With few exceptions, "secure" systems need to be
penetrated - under authorized circumstances by trusted
people. 169 Unfortunately, there is inherently no way to prove
trust, the best that any identification system can do is confirm
not-yet-proven-untrustworthy status, i.e. confirm that a
particular individual is not on a watch list for example. 170
This essentially creates three classes of users of any
system based only on identification, those confirmed as
untrustworthy and denied access (and there may be false
positives), those deemed not-untrustworthy who are in-fact
trustworthy and are allowed access (good guys), and those
deemed not-untrustworthy who are in-fact untrustworthy but
have not yet been identified as such and may be mistakenly
allowed access (false negatives).
Therefore, any system of identification needs to be part of
a larger security system that recognizes, and compensates for,
this problem. So, for example, a system for screening
passengers (like CAPPS II or its successor, "Secure Flight")171
systems and is not the same as mere physical security against a specific
terrorist threat. Focusing only on the latter - physical security - is in my
view myopic and best left for security consultants selling books. Policy
analysts should consider security in its broader sense.
On the other hand, too much security theater can result in
complacency and a false sense of security if such "feel good" measures are not
also accompanied by real security strategies. Also, their cost - in terms of
resource allocation or friction - needs to be considered in the context of their
overall benefit. See Taipale, Losing the War, supra note 25.
168 See generally National Computer Security Center, A Guide to
Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted Systems, NCSC-TG-
003-87 Library No. S-228, 576 (Sep. 30, 1987), available at
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-003.html.
169 Schneier, supra note 167, at 181.
170 See supra note 166 (discussing problems with watch lists).
171 The Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening ("CAPPS
II") was a Transportation Safety Administration project designed to pre-
screen passengers to assess threat levels to aviation security. For a detailed
discussion of CAPPS II, see Taipale, supra note 13, at 37-39. The CAPPS II
program has been "scrapped" but a new program is being developed. See,
e.g., Chris Stromh, DHS scraps computer pre-screening system, starts over,
GovEXEC.COM, July 15, 2004 at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/O704!O71504cl.htm; Larry Greenemeie,
CAPPS II Is Dead, Says Ridge, But Door Is Open For CAPPS III,
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should be combined with random searching of non-flagged
passengers to provide layered security. 172
Another general problem in security systems is balancing
security with usability or funetionaity.173  Authentication
imposes friction or overhead on a system and can interfere with
its usefulness. In the context of the 'war on terrorism' security
systems based on authentication that impose too high a cost on
functionality risk undermining the very system for which
protection is sought. 174 Thus, for example, too high a burden in
terms of physical intrusion or time spent in airport security
screening lines can undermine the air transportation system.
Inefficient port security can fail in two ways - terrorists can
gain entrance or legitimate commerce can be impeded to the
point that it interferes with trade. Denying access to
immigrants or visa-applicants deprives the economy of needed
talent. This issue is beyond the scope of this article except,
however, as it relates to privacy concerns. To the extent that
any security system imposes privacy costs on users out of
proportion to the perceived threat, it risks undermining the
confidence and support that is required from existing users for
systems to function or for systems to attract new users - i.e., the
capital and talent it needs for proper functioning or further
development.
INFORMATION WEEK, July 15, 2004 at httr://www.informationweek.com/
story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=23901115. But see note 166 supra
(discussing problems with watch lists for screening); and Laura Murphy &
Barry Steinhardt, ACLU Comments to Department of Homeland Security on
the "Passenger and Aviation Security Screening Records (Sep. 30, 2003)
available at http :iiwww.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?
ID=13847&c=206. On September 21, 2004, TSA announced the filing and
release of a Privacy Impact Statement and a Systems of Records Notice for
the testing phase of "Secure Flight" the follow-on program to CAPPS II. See
Press Release, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation
Safety Administration (Sep. 21, 2004) available at
http ://www.tsa. gov/public/displav?theme=44&content=09000519800cf2f3.
172 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.285. Combining a screening
system with random checks also protects against counter-programming (that
is, adaptive behavior on the part of terrorists). Id. (discussing vulnerability
of CAPPS II to "Carnival Booth" attacks).
173 NRC, supra note 147, at 80-103.
174 Taipale, Losing the Wa-r supra note 25. Note that as a
general rule, access control mechanisms impose a higher cost on functionality
than accountability systems. This cost tends to increase as systems scale,
thus, trade-offs between system security and functionality need to be




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/6
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
2. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Identification systems can either enhance or intrude upon
privacy depending on their use and context. 175 Identification
systems can enhance privacy when they are used to secure data
or to protect identity, for example, by ensuring that an
individual is indeed the authorized user of a credit card or a
particular computer network, or is permitted access to certain
information. Identification systems can also provide
convenience, for example, by allowing personalized services to be
delivered.176
On the other hand, identification systems can be intrusive
of privacy and their use can be self-proliferating. Proliferation
occurs when the prevalence of a security paradigm premised on
fully mediated access becomes the norm. 177 For example, once
ID checks are common for boarding airplanes or entering
government buildings, they become acceptable (or required) for
lesser uses - for example, prior to boarding trains or buses, or
entering stores, etc.
Additionally, identification systems themselves tend to
increase the collection of personal data, for example, by creating
additional transaction records at the time and place of
authentication, and may also expose personal information to
additional disclosure at multiple points during the operation of
the system or subsequently. 178 Availability of these transaction
records may also allow for linkages and profiling, and the ability
to create digital dossiers, not otherwise possible. 179
Also, as noted above, the use of identification or
authentication systems in conjunction with access control
175 NRC, supra note 147, at 55-56.
176 Consumers seem willing to trade personal information for
personalized service as they increasingly perceive the value of such service,
see Joshua Weinberger, The Price of Personalization, destinationCRM.com
(July 28, 2004) at http://www.destinationcrm.com/articles/default.asp?
ArticlelD=4312 ("A new survey shows that consumers are willing to part
with personal data in return for personalized service"). However, cL
Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1501-1505 (discussing the economics of privacy
myopia, that is, the problems arising from individuals valuing privacy at its
marginal cost and aggregators valuing it at its average cost.).
177 NRC, supra note 147, at 55.
178 NRC, supra note 147, at 56-57.
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strategies may challenge traditional notions of freedom. In
particular, access control strategies may impact on individual
autonomy, including freedom of speech (denying access to
information or communication systems),18° freedom to travel or
peaceably assemble (by denying access to particular modes of
transport),181 and freedom to petition the government (by
denying access to government buildings or other resources).
Certain privacy impacts cannot be eliminated as they are
inherent in the act of authentication, which requires the
revelation and confirmation of some 'identifying' information to
function, however, identification and authentication systems can
be designed to minimize these privacy impacts and maximize
security gains. 182 Further, identification should not be required
where it does not provide a security gain. Thus, for example, a
distinction should be drawn between systems or occasions when
an identifier is required for security and situations where only
authentication is required.183
In addition, even where identification or authentication
strategies are appropriate, they should be designed so as to
180 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Barring Web Use after Web Crime, N.
Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003 at A:1 (discussing whether persons who commit a
computer crime can be barred from use of the Internet after their release).
181 See e.g., Gilmore v. Ashcroft, No. C02-No. C02-3444 SI (N.D.
Cal.), challenging the requirement to show identification prior to boarding a
commercial aircraft. On March 23, 2004 the district court dismissed
plaintiffs complaint holding that the requirement for identification did not
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, or, if it did, it was
reasonable, and that such requirement did not infringe on plaintiffs right to
travel, associate or petition government. See Nixon Peabody LP, Aviation
Law Alert, April 2004, available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com'
linked media/publications/ALA 04082004.pdf
182 Government should not build a massive identification
surveillance system unless such features are built in. See K. A. Taipale,
Statement at a Meeting of the Program on Law Enforcement and National
Security in the Information Age (Oct. 29, 2004), in Press Release, Center for
Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy (Oct. 29, 2004) available
at http ://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=39202 ("Congress
should not rush to legislate a massive government identity surveillance
system under the press of a politically expedient deadline without
considering alternatives that can meet legitimate law enforcement and
national security needs while still protecting privacy").
183 See, e.g., Dan Farmer and Charles C. Mann, Surveillance
Nation-Part Two, MIT TECH. REV. (May 2003) (describing how personal data
on Malaysia's smart card chips - designed to replace driver's licenses - are
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neither require more personal information than is necessary for
the particular security application (and even then in proportion
to the threat) nor generate additional transaction records
beyond what is required for the particular security purpose.1l
4
Pseudonymization strategies, discussed infra, based on
certificated authorizations from trusted third parties, selective
disclosure of identifying information, and escrowed identity, can
be designed to protect identity privacy but still meet legitimate
law enforcement and security needs.
B. TECHNOLOGIES OF DATA AGGREGATION AND
ANALYSIS
For an in-depth analysis of data aggregation and data
analysis technologies, particularly data mining, see Data Mining
and Domestic Security." Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of
Da ta. 1 85
1. DATA AGGREGATION, DATA ANALYSIS, AND
SECURITY
Recent reports by the U.S. Congress,18 6 the National
Research Council, 187 the Markle Foundation i8 8 and others have
highlighted that the amount of available data to be analyzed for
184 See "The Relationship between Authentication and
Identification," NRC, supra note 147, at 51-54. Cf Hiibel v. Nevada, No. 03-
5554 (S. Ct. June 21, 2004) (holding that requiring a suspect to disclose their
name during Terry stop is permissible).
185 Taipale, supra note 13; see also Mary DeRosa, Data Mining
and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (March 2004).
186 Joint Inquiry Report, supra note 22, at 6.
187 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING THE NATION SAFER:
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
(Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, ed., 2002),
available at http://www.nap.edu/html/stct/index.html:
Currently one of [intelligence agencies'] significant problems
is managing a flood of data that may be relevant to their
efforts to track suspected terrorists and their activities ...
There are well-known examples in which planned terrorist
activities went undetected despite the fact that evidence was
available to spot it - the relevant evidence was just one
needle in a huge haystack.
188 First Markle Report, supra note 21.
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domestic security purposes exceeds the capacity to analyze it.
Further, these reports identify a failure to use information
technology to effectively address this problem.18 9 Among the
recommendations are the increased use of data aggregation
(information sharing) and automated analysis (in particular
data mining) technologies. 190
a) DATA AGGREGATION
Data itself can become more meaningful through
aggregation or sharing.191 First, data may be meaningless in any
particular location but becomes increasingly useful as people
perceive it to be useful within their local context. Second, data
may become more valuable in proximity to other data when
previously unknown relationships may become evident.
Data aggregation (including data integration and data
sharing) is intended to overcome the "stovepipe" nature of
existing datasets. 192  Research here is focused on making
information available to analysts regardless of where it is
located or how it is structured. 193
A threshold systems design issue that has technical,
security and privacy implications is whether to aggregate data
in a centralized data warehouse or to access information locally
in distributed databases. 194  An architecture based on
distributed data sources provides additional privacy
189 See id.
190 See, e.g., Joint Inquiry Report, supra note 22, at 6-7.
191 See K. A. Taipale, Presentation at Heritage Foundation, A
Critique of the Markle Report on Trusted Information Networks for
Homeland Security at slides 5-7, December 11, 2003, at
htt-p://www.taipale.org/presentations/CAS-Markle -121103.htm; see also Hal
Varian, Pricing Information Goods, in PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOLARSHIP IN THE
NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT SYMPOSIUM, HARv. LAW SCHOOL (May
1995).
192 Organizational stovepipes may exist between agencies or
within agencies and technical stovepipes between different databases that
are technically incompatible or use different data base structures to store
information.
193 See Taipale, supra note 13, at 45-46 (discussing DARPA IAO's
project Genisys for virtual data aggregation).
194 Taipale, supra note 13, at 42-44 (discussing the technical,
security and privacy implications between aggregating data from disparate
sources into one central database ("warehousing") or integrating data sources
by accessing individual distributed databases ("federated access")).
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protection. 195 First, it provides additional technical intervention
points for rules-based interventions, for example, for the
insertion of "privacy appliance" middleware. 196  Second, a
distributed architecture provides additional organizational
checks and balances against abuse by maintaining local (or
distributed) control over data access, user authentication, and
logs. 197
b) AUTOMATED ANALYSIS
Automated data analysis (including data-mining) is
intended to turn low-level data, usually too voluminous to
understand, into higher forms (information or knowledge) that
might be more compact (for example, a summary), more abstract
(for example, a descriptive model), or more useful (for example, a
predictive model).198 "A key problem [for using data mining for
counter-terrorism] is to identify high-level things -
organizations and activities - based on low-level data - people,
places, things and events." 19 9
Domestic security or law enforcement needs for data
mining differ from commercial data mining applications in
significant ways.20 0 Commercial data mining techniques are
generally applied against large transaction databases in order to
195 A distributed architecture also has implications for efficiency
in information management as well as for system security, see id.
196 "Privacy appliances," as envisioned in the TIA program,
would act as gateways between databases and analysts and enforce access
rules, due process procedures or accounting policies as discussed throughout
this article. See Matthew Fordhal, Researchers Seek to Safeguard Privacy
in Anti-terrorism Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, July 14, 2003, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgibin/PrintStory.pl?document id=1352628
38&zsection id=268448455&slug=btprivacy14&date=200307 14; see also TAO
Report, supra note 68, at A-13 ("DARPA is examining the feasibility of a
privacy appliance ... to enforce access rules and accounting policy.") See
discussion of privacy appliances infra VII.A.
197 See David Jensen, Data Mining in Networks, Presentation to
the Roundtable on Social and Behavior Sciences and Terrorism of the
National Research Council, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and
Education, Committee on Law and Justice, at slide 18, (Dec. 1, 2002),
available at http://kdl.cs.umass.edu/peop1e/Ijensen/papers/nrdbsseO2.html
("This approach keeps institutional control of databases distributed,
providing a bulwark against both outside intruders and widespread
institutional misuse.")
198 Taipale, supra note 13, at 22.
199 Jensen, supra note 197, at slide 22.
200 Taipale, supra note 13, at 33-35, 47.
TAIPALE
51
TAIPALE: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
classify people according to transaction characteristics and
extract patterns of widespread applicability. The problem in
counter-terrorism is to focus on a smaller number of subjects
within a large background population and identify links and
relationships from a far wider variety of activities.
20 1
Commercial data mining is focused on classifying
propositional data from homogeneous databases (of like
transactions, for example, book sales) while domestic security
applications seek to detect rare but significant relational links
between heterogeneous data (people, places, things, activities,
associations, etc.). In general, commercial users have been
concerned with identifying patterns among unrelated subjects
based on their transaction patterns in order to make predictions
about other unrelated subjects doing the same. 20 2 Intelligence
analysts are generally interested in identifying patterns that
evidence organizations or activities among related subjects in
order to expose additional related subjects or activities. 20 3
The application of data aggregation and automated
analysis technologies to domestic security is the attempt to
"make sense of data" by automating certain analytic tasks.20 4
Automating such tasks can allow for better and more timely
analysis of existing datasets by identifying and cataloging
various threads and pieces of information that may already exist
but remain unnoticed using traditional means. In addition,
these tools can help develop predictive models based on known
or unknown patterns to identify additional people, objects or
actions that are deserving of further resource commitment or
law enforcement attention.
Compounding the problem for data analysis in domestic
security applications is that relevant data (that is, information
about terrorist organizations and activities) is hidden within
vast amounts of irrelevant data and appears innocuous (or at
least ambivalent) when viewed in isolation. Individual data
items - relating to people, places and events, even if identified
201 IAO Report, supra note 68, at A-14.
202 A simple example of commercial data mining techniques that
should be familiar to most readers can be experienced at amazon.com, which
uses "association rules" to suggest books, CDs and other products that a user
might be interested in purchasing on return visits based on correlations
between that users purchases and purchases by other users.
203 Taipale, supra note 13, at 47.
204 Taipale, supra note 13, at 21-22.
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as relevant - are essentially meaningless unless viewed in
context of their relation to other data points. It is the network
or pattern itself that must be identified, analyzed and acted
upon. 20
5
There are three distinct applications for automated
analysis in the context of domestic security:2
06
* first, subject-oriented link analysis, that is,
automated analysis to learn more about a particular data
subject, their relationships, associations and actions;
* second, pattern-analysis (or data mining in the
narrow sense), that is, automated analysis to develop a
descriptive or predictive model based on discovered
patterns; and,
* third, pattern-matching, that is, automated
analysis using a descriptive or predictive model (whether
the model itself is developed through automated analysis
or not) against additional datasets to identify other
related (or "like") data subjects (people, places, things,
relationships, etc.).
205 See Jensen, supra note 197, at slides 21, 22 (identifying the
key challenge for counter-terrorism as "analyzing relational data"). An
example of how relational data analysis can be useful for counter terrorism
can be seen in the analysis of betweeness in email traffic. "By looking for
patterns in email traffic, a new technique can quickly identify online
communities and the key people in them. The approach could mean
terrorists or criminal gangs give themselves away, even if they are
communicating in code or only discussing the weather." Hazel Muir, Email
Traffic Patterns can Reveal Ringleaders, NEW SCIENTIST, at
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99993550 (Mar. 27, 2003).
See also Philip Vos Fellman & Roxana Wright, Modeling Terrorist Networks:
Complex Systems at the Mid-Range, presented at Complexity, Ethics and
Creativity Conference, LSE, September 17-18, 2003; H. Brinton Milward &
Jorg Raab, Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and Performance of
International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks, presented at the
International Conference on Empirical Study of Governance, Management
and Performance, Barcelona, Spain, October 4-5, 2002; Matthew Dombroski
et al, Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH
INTERNATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
SYMPOSIUM (2003); D. B. Skillicorn, Applying Matrix Decomposition to
Counterterrorism, Queen's University, Canada, Technical Report 2004 484
(May 19, 2004).
206 Taipale, supra note 13, at 34.
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Because spectacular terrorist events may be too rare or
infrequent for automated analysis to extract useful patterns, the
focus of these techniques in counter terrorism is generally to
identify lower level, frequently repeated events (for example,
illegal immigration, money transfers, front businesses and
recruiting activity), or to identify communication patterns
evidencing covert organization, that together may warrant
further attention or resource commitment. 207
Data aggregation and automated analysis are not
substitutes for human analytic decision-making, rather, they are
tools that can help manage vast data volumes and potentially
identify relational networks or other patterns that may remain
hidden to traditional analysis. 208  If successful, these
technologies can help allocate available domestic security
resources to more likely targets.
2. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Because data aggregation and automated analysis
technologies can cast suspicion based on recognizing
relationships between individually innocuous data, they raise
legitimate privacy concerns. However, much of the public
debate regarding the potential use of these technologies is
overshadowed by simplifications, misunderstandings and
misrepresentations about what the technologies can do, how
207 Jensen, supra note 197, at slide 25. See generally Vladis E.
Krebs, Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, FIRST MONDAY (mapping and
analyzing the relational network among the September 11 hijackers), at
http:i/www.firstmondav.dk/issues/issue7 4/krebs/; see also the references in
note 205 supra.
208 However, the use of probabilistic models developed through
data mining can substantially improve human decision-making in some
contexts. See Jensen, supra note 197, at slide 39. Using probabilistic models
can focus human attention and resources, can outperform humans in certain
limited contexts (for example, in certain clinical medical diagnostic
applications), and can encourage an institutional culture of hypothesis
testing and probability assessment. Id. See generally Tversky, Judgment
under Uncertainty, supra note 39; KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 39 (both describing biased heuristics used in
human judgment); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical versus Actuarial
Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (describing how statistical/actuarial methods
often outperform human judgment in certain diagnostic contexts); Tal Z.
Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business, 1 YALE J. L. & TECH. 8, 47-48 (2003)
("There is no convincing reason to suppose that decisions made by software
are inferior to the ones made by humans (and... there are several occasions
where the opposite is true).").
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they are likely to be employed, and what actual affects their
employ may have on privacy and security. 20 9  Further,
arguments premised on finding pattern-matching (or any
automated analysis) constitutionally objectionable on their face
are based more on ideological rhetoric than legal analysis.
The significant privacy concerns relating to these
technologies are primarily of two kinds: those that arise from
the aggregation (or integration) of data itself and those that
arise from the automated analysis of data that may not be based
on any individualized suspicion - the former might be called the
database problem and the latter the miningproblem.210
The database problem is implicated in subject-based
inquiries that aggregate data or access distributed databases to
find more information about a particular subject. To the extent
that maintaining certain government inefficiencies helps protect
individual rights from centralized state power, the primary
privacy question involved in aggregation is one of increased
government efficiency 211 and the resulting demise of "practical
obscurity."2 12
The mining problem is implicated in the use of pattern-
matching inquiries, in which profiles or models are run against
data to identify unknown individuals. To some, pattern-
209 Even within the technical community there is significant
divergence in the understanding what these technologies can do, what
particular government research programs entail, and the potential impact on
privacy and civil liberties of these technologies and programs. Compare
Letter from Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing
Machinery to Senators John Warner and Carl Levin (Jan. 23, 2003)
(expressing reservations about the TIA program) available at
http://wwwacmorgusacm/Letters/tia finalhtml, with Executive Committee
SIGKDD of the ACM, Data Mining is NOT Against Civil Liberties (June 30,
rev'd July 28, 2003) available at http://www.acm.org/sigkdd/civil-liberties.pdf
(defending data mining technology and expressing concern that the public
debate has been ill-informed and misleading); see also Rosenzweig, supra
note 13, at n.6 ("Even among computer professionals there is substantial
misunderstanding ... [but] those with the seeming greater familiarity with
the technologies are less apocalyptic in their reactions.").
210 Taipale, supra note 13, at 57-67 (for a more detailed
discussion of these issues).
211 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 181.
212 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489
U.S. 749, 780 (1989) explicitly recognizing that the aggregation of public
records in one place negated the "practical obscurity" that protected those
records in the world of distributed paper records. See discussion in Taipale,
supra note 13, at 58-60.
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matching inherently raises privacy issues relating to non-
particularized suspicion in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 213 I disagree.
For a particular method to be categorically unreasonable
or suspect in the context of the Fourth Amendment, its efficacy
- that is, the confidence interval for its particular use - must
first be determined and considered. Thus, for example, racial or
ethnic profiling for law enforcement purposes may be inherently
unreasonable because it is not a reliable predictor of criminality
and thus cannot be the sole basis for a reasonable suspicion. 214
(On the other hand, ethnic profiling might be appropriate for
medical screening where there is a proven link between a
particular condition and ethnic background.)215
However, to assert that automated pattern analysis based
on behavior or data profiles is inherently unreasonable or
suspect without determining its efficacy - that is, without
determining the relationship between the pattern and its results
in a particular application - seems not only inappropriate but
also analytically unsound.216
213 See Taipale, supra note 13, at 60-67. I use the phrase non-
particularized suspicion in discussing the charge by some privacy advocates
that these technologies or techniques using pattern-based queries may be
constitutionally suspect because they do not meet the general requirement
that "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure," United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 561 (1976). However, it should be noted that "the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such [individualized] suspicion," id.,
and the appropriate test requires balancing the potential intrusion with the
state interest in the context of the circumstances.
214 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886
(1975). Note, however, the Supreme Court has never ruled explicitly on
whether race can be a relevant factor for reasonable suspicion under the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 885-887 (implying that race could be a
relevant, but not sole, factor). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1996).
215 For example, Tay-Sachs disease, see
http:i/www.marchofdimes.com/professionals/681 1227.asp, last visited Dec. 6,
2004 or sickle cell anemia, see htt2://www.ascaa.org/comm.htm, last visited
Dec. 6, 2004.
216 And, the asserted equivalence of behavior profiling with racial
profiling (and therefore inherently intrusive of privacy or otherwise
abhorrent) is a rhetorical tactic used to misdirect the public debate and such
assertion does not hold up under more rigorous analysis. Behavior is, of
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For example, a pattern-based analysis (automated or not)
that was 100% accurate (gave no false positives and no false
negatives) in identifying terrorists and only terrorists before
they acted could not be constitutionally unreasonable. Such
accuracy would far exceed even a stringent requirement of
probable cause - indeed, absolute accuracy (if it were possible)
would prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the policy
issue with regard to pattern-matching ought to be deciding what
accuracy rate is appropriate or required under what
circumstances (or what error rate is acceptable as reasonable)
and what consequences appropriately flow from its use, not
demonizing a technology or technique.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the
determination of whether particular criteria are sufficient to
meet the reasonable suspicion or probable cause standard does
not turn on the probabilistic nature of the criteria but on their
probative weight. In United States v. Cortez217 the Court
opined:
The process [of determining reasonable suspicion]
does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities
was articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common-sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same - and so are law
enforcement officers. 2 18
In United States v. Sokolow2A1 9 the Court specifically
rejected the approach of the Court of Appeals, which had divided
criteria into evidence of "ongoing criminal behavior," on the one
hand, and "probabilistic" evidence, on the other. Further, with
respect to the use of patterns to establish suspicion, 220 the Court
held:
Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any
illegal conduct and is quite consistent with
innocent travel. But we think taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion. See Florida v.
Royer. We said in Reid v. Georgia, "there could, of
217 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
218 Id at 418.
219 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
220 Sokolow involved the use of DEA drug courier profiles.
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course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful
conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot." Indeed, Terry [v. Ohio] itself
involved "a series of acts, each of them perhaps
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which taken
together warranted further investigation." See also
[United States v.] Cortez. We noted in [Illinois v.]
Gates that "innocent behavior will frequently
provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,"
and that "[i]n making a determination of probable
cause the relevant inquiry is not whether
particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the
degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types
of noncriminal acts." That principle applies equally
well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry. [citations
omitted]221
The fact that patterns of relevant criteria may be
generated by automated analysis (data-mined) or matched
through automated means (computerized matching) should not
change the analysis - the reasonableness of the basis for
suspicion should be judged on its probative value (efficacy in
evidencing reasonable suspicion) in the particular circumstances
of its use 222 - not on its probabilistic nature or whether it is
technically mediated.
But, it is further argued, applying automated pattern-
based analysis to data may still be qualitatively different from
existing methods because it is initiated not on the trail of a
particular suspect individual but on a non-particularized
suspicion that a given data population might contain evidence of
"terrorists." For example, Solove writes that pattern-matching
"alters the way that government investigations typically
occur"223 and Priscilla Regan contends that pattern-matching
investigates everyone, and most people who are investigated are
innocent. 224
But, how is pattern-matching qualitatively different (for
that is the claim) then existing methods? While there is
221 490 U.S. at 9-10.
222 See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ("But the essence of all that has
been written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture -
must be taken into account.").
223 Solove, supra note 63, at 1109.
224 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 90 (1995).
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certainly a legitimate debate to be had about whether a
particular technique (see discussion of method of inquiry below)
should be applied to a particular data space (see discussion of
scope of inquiry and sensitivity of data below), that debate is not
premised on the novelty of automated behavior or data profiling,
only the expectation of (or desire for) privacy for certain data
sets (assuming comparable circumstances).
The point is not that there is no privacy issue involved
with the electronic equivalent of observing suspicious behavior
in a public space based on a general concern about terrorism,
but only that the issue to be resolved is the traditional concern
of expectations of privacy for the particular space being observed
under those circumstances, and the reasonableness of the
government action based on the observation - not a categorical
finding of "non-particularized suspicion" based on technique. 225
The doctrine of non-particularized suspicion 226 ought to only
have applicability in cases where the pattern matching is
unreasonable because the pattern itself is found not to be an
effective predictor of criminality (for example, profiling based
solely on race) thus cannot be said to provide reasonable or
probable cause to take further action. 227
Thus, from a policy point of view, the issue to be
determined regarding automated analysis and pattern-matching
is what predicate procedures and/or oversight, and what judicial
review, should be applied to particular pattern-based
applications or programs to ensure that they are effective and
225 Cf Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559-67 (holding routine
traffic checkpoints and selective referral for secondary inspections reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment).
226 If there even is a constitutional requirement for
individualized suspicion. As noted above, the Court has explicitly recognized
that the requirement for individualized suspicion is not irreducible. See supra
note 213. In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989),
the Court also explicitly noted that where the government interest - as here
with terrorism - serves a need beyond routine law enforcement, the
practicality of requiring individualized suspicion is also a relevant factor:
Our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical
to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion
in the particular context.
227 See discussion supra; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886.
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reasonable for their intended purpose within the totality of the
circumstances of their use, 228 and how that efficacy relates to
what data they should access. Pattern-based queries, even those
based on behavior or data profiling, are reasonable or
unreasonable only in the context of their intended application 2
29
- not because they are automated or not. Establishing
procedures for implementation and making a determination of
reasonableness either prior to employ (authorization), during
their general use (oversight) or after their use in a particular
case (judicial review) requires analyzing the calculus of
reasonableness described below.
To argue that the use of a technique - pattern-matching -
is inherently unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
without actually determining the reasonableness of its use
(based on its efficacy in context and the circumstances of its use)
would mean that the Fourth Amendment prohibits all
preemptive policing strategies. That is, any investigation or
allocation of resources based on the observation of suspicious
behavior prior to the actual commission of a crime (or based on
the analysis of historical experience with criminal activity)
would be unreasonable absent a prior showing that the specific
observed behavior relates to that particular crime. Taking this
to its logical extreme would mean that any proactive policing
strategy to allocate resources, including assigning a police officer
to a high crime location, would be unconstitutional if it was not
in response to a specific observed behavior relating to a
particular crime. Such a conclusion seems unwarranted as a
matter of both policy and law.230
Nevertheless, because they are statistical based
techniques, it is important to emphasize again that these
technologies, including pattern-based queries, should generally
not to be used to determine guilt or innocence but rather to
allocate security resources exactly like any other proactive
228 Cf TAPAC Report, supra note 90, at 45-59 (recommending
programmatic approval for data mining applications).
229 And, determining such reasonableness requires judging,
among other things, the severity of the consequences to the individual from a
potential false positive match. A false positive with limited consequences -
for example, a non-intrusive follow-up investigation - must be weighed
against the legitimate state interest in security.
230 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559-67; see generally
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policing strategy. Thus, their reasonableness for general use in
allocating resources or attention should be judged according to
the policy calculus described below and their constitutional
reasonableness in a particular case can be subject to later
judicial review just like any other investigative procedure.
There are legitimate privacy concerns relating to the use
of these technologies (just like with any other policing
technique) - but there is not a presumptive Fourth Amendment
non-particularized suspicion problem inherent in the technology
or the technique even in the case of automated behavioral or
data pattern-matching. The privacy issue in both subject- and
pattern-based queries is determining reasonableness in the
context of a particular use - and that determination hinges on
the calculus set forth below not a predetermination that a
technology or technique is categorically suspect.
C. TECHNOLOGIES OF COLLECTION
The technologies of collection are those that extend the
edge of the network or add information to the data sets.231
Broadly, collection technologies may include the identification
technologies and aggregation and analysis technologies already
discussed above (to the extent that they add new data), as well
as what are commonly referred to as surveillance or search
technologies, including image and signal collection
technologies. 232
For example, facial recognition technology can serve as
both an identification technology - authenticating a particular
attribute at the point of verification - or as a collection
technology - by recording an identity match as a transaction
record. So too, data aggregation can be viewed in terms of either
aggregating data sets or collecting additional data about a
subject. Also analysis, to the extent that it creates new data (for
231 This Article is generally concerned with the issues arising
from digital information systems and networks. These systems significantly
affect the five processes that determine information management strategies
in social activity, including law enforcement - their collection; storage;
transmission; selection; and intelligent processing. Existing policies,
including privacy policies and related regulatory and legal structures,
premised on old models for assessing and controlling these processes are
under significant stress.
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example, identifying a pattern or link), can be viewed as a
collection technology because it creates new information about
(or that can be linked to) existing data.233
However, this section is generally concerned with those
collection technologies more commonly associated with
surveillance or search and often referred to as sense-enhaneing
technologies.
234
1. SENSE-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES AND
SECURITY
Sense-enhancing technologies are simply those
technologies used to enhance the human ability to observe or
recognize physical characteristics or activities.235 Generally,
these technologies can be further classified as those that amplify
the existing human senses, or those that extend these senses by
making previously undetectable phenomena observable.
Examples of technologies that amplify human senses include
such 'low-tech' devices as binoculars, telescopes and cameras as
well as 'no-tech' devices such as drug sniffing dogs, but also
include 'high-tech' devices, for example, sensors that can hear
through walls. Examples of technologies that extend the senses
include various devices that measure wavelengths not usually
detectable, such as infrared or ultra-violet sensors, radar and
even radio receivers. Additionally, sense-enhancing technologies
233 An interesting question that has not yet been addressed is
whether queries themselves (or new information, such as links, generated
through query) become part of the information about the individual and
subject to some new legal interest on the part of that individual - i.e., does
the fact of processing itself become part of the digital dossier. If so, other
questions arise: will queries be subject to, for example, the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, amended by Public Law No. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048 (1996) (assuming for a moment that the intelligence or law
enforcement exceptions are not applicable)? Should they be as part of error
correction policies? C. how credit report queries become part of the report
and are themselves then subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681 et seq.
234 See Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1496 ("Sense enhanced
searches rely on one or more technologies to detect that which ordinarily
could not be detected with un-aided human senses"); David. E. Steinberg,
Making Sense of Sense-enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1
("this article uses the term "sense-enhanced search" to describe any [search]
through the use of some method that provides information not available to
the unaided sensory perceptions.").
235 Cf Steinberg, supra note 234.
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could be categorized as those that provide a new perspective
from which to observe, for example, aircraft over-flight or
satellite remote sensing236 and those that interpose human
senses (e.g., hearing) within mediated information flows, for
example, the classic wiretap intercepting electronic
representations of human speech from the telephone system.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss specific
sensing technology in any detail. Rather, we seek here to
understand functionally how these collection technologies
interact with system design and privacy concerns, and where
technical intervention or design strategies might be applicable
to provide for due process protections for privacy policy.237
2. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Privacy issues involving remote or enhanced sensing
generally tend to revolve around the appropriateness of place
and manner of collection and turn on whether there exists a
reasonable expectation ofprivay.238 In general, the courts have
struggled to determine whether the use of any particular new
technology is a search under the Fourth Amendment, and, if so,
was it reasonable.239
Historically, the Supreme Court based its analysis on the
existence (or absence) of a physical trespass or handling of
property in deciding whether a challenged government action
amounted to a search requiring a warrant under the Fourth
236 These categorizations are not exclusive and some technologies
provide multiple functions, for example, a low light camera with telephoto
lens mounted on an aircraft amplifies human vision, extends it into low light
situations, and allows for direct overhead observation.
237 For an overview of policy considerations to be considered with
sense-enhanced surveillance systems, see, for example, ABA Standards for
Technology-enhanced Surveillance, supra note 163.
238 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (holding that
the use of a wiretap requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment).
239 U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Amendment. 240 Despite the rejection of this physicality test in
Katz v. United States, 24 1 the courts have continued to proceed
"from the premise that [sense-enhanced] searches are less
intrusive than physical searches" in analyzing new
technologies, 242 and "remain likely to invalidate only those
warrantless searches that involve a physical trespass into a
constitutionally protected area."243 Thus, for example, the Court
has upheld the warrantless use of a beeper to monitor a
container transported by car, 244 but found that monitoring such
a beeper in the home violates the Fourth Amendment.
245
In rejecting the physicality test in Katz, the Court set out
the two-part reasonable expectation of privacy test, which
requires finding both an actual subjective expectation of privacy
and a reasonable objective one:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable. 246
Although the Court has never explicitly articulated the
following distinction, I would generalize the Court's approach to
new technologies since Katz as follows:
Where a new technology merely amplifies the existing
human senses the Court has generally upheld sense-enhanced
searches by inferring no reasonable subjective expectation of
privacy since the technology in question merely allowed the
observation of activity that could have been viewed anyway and
240 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)
(upholding warrantless wiretaps because such searches did not involve a
physical trespass) (overruled in Katz).
241 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
242 Steinberg, supra note 234, at 568.
243 Id. at 585.
244 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. at
281)
245 United States v. Karo, 486 U.S. 705, 706 (1984) ("monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence, a location not opened to visual
surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment.")
246 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."247  Thus, under an analogy to the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement, 248 the Court has
sanctioned the use of airplanes to conduct an aerial search
without a warrant, 249 and the use of an electronic beeper to
track movements on the public roads. 250  Following this same
reasoning, the courts have also generally upheld the use of
telescopes and binoculars, even in some cases when used to view
a constitutionally protected area, for example, a home or office,
from a public space. 251
However, where a new technology extends the ability for
human senses to observe something previously commonly held
to be unobservable, the Court has extended Fourth Amendment
protection, in essence arguing that there is a presumptive
objective expectation of privacy in such cases. Thus, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Court held "where, as here, the Government
uses a[n infrared scanning] device that is not in genera] public
use, to explore details of the home that would prevously have
247 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
248 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); see also
Steinberg, supra note 234, at 596-601.
249 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) ("Any
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have
seen everything that these officers observed."); Dow Chemical v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (upholding use of sophisticated cameras
during overflight, "the mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems");
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (upholding warrantless use of
helicopter at 400 feet, "[a]ny member of the public could legally have been
flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and
could have observed Riley's greenhouse.")
250 Knotts, supra note 244. Under what could be called the
"plain smell" doctrine, the Court has also upheld the use of dogs to enhance
smell. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983). Following this
reasoning, it has been argued that passive alcohol sensors are not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., SHENEQUA L. GREY,
PASSIVE ALCOHOL SENSORS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, Civic RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (Spring 2001) available at http:i/www.ndaa-
apri.orgiapri/programsitrafficipassive alcohol sensors fourth amendment 2.
html. The ACLU has opposed such passive sensors, see, for example, Sniffer'
Device a Violation of Privacy?, ABOUT.COM at
http://alcoholism.about.com/library/weekly/aaOOO823a.htm
251 See Steinberg, supra note 234, at 605-609.
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been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."252
In analyzing new technology-enhanced searches, the
Court has also drawn a distinction between aural and visual
enhancements, in general applying a stricter standard to
enhanced hearing than vision. 253 For example, in Dow Chemieal
v. United States the Court upheld the warrantless use of
sophisticated camera equipment used in an aerial search but
concluding that "an electronic device used to penetrate walls or
windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions ...
would raise very different and far more serious questions."25
4
Commentators have attributed this distinction to a particular
concern for protecting communication, implicating First
Amendment concerns. 255 Whether this heightened concern for
communication would extend to email or other forms of
electronic communication has not been resolved.256
In any case, as Solove has pointed out, the Court's current
conception of Fourth Amendment protected privacy is based
primarily on maintaining secrecy of information: "The Court's
new conception of privacy is one of total secrecy. If any
information is exposed to the public or if law enforcement
officials can view something from any public vantage point, then
252 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (emphasis
added).
253 Steinberg, supra note 234, at 592.
254 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238-239.
255 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 234, at 595.
256 However, the courts of appeals have held that the
interception of communications from radio frequencies that are accessible to
the general public does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, even
though radio waves cannot be perceived by natural senses (and certainly
involve human communication). See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23,
26 (1st Cir. 1982); Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La.
1986), afrd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986). And, with respect to email, cf
United States v. Councilman 373 F.3d 197(1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
private party interception of email while in temporary storage during transit
is not a violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.). Although this
case turns specifically on questions of statutory interpretation it appears that
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the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy."257
Earlier in this Article, I argued that the privacy lobby has
a fetish for secrecy of data over autonomy of the individual -
here then is the source of such fetish: by rooting its conception
of privacy narrowly in total secrecy based on concealment, the
Supreme Court has constructed an artificial all-or-nothing
standard at odds with the implicit balancing of interests
required by the Fourth Amendment's demand for
reasonableness. 258
An additional problem with the Court's emphasis on
secrecy and analysis of expectation based on whether a
technology is in common usage, is that it is an uncertain
standard sure to shrink the realm of privacy since the more
common a particular intrusive technology becomes, the less the
Fourth Amendment will protect. 259
Solove has argued that this limited conception of privacy
as total secrecy is not in keeping with the architecture of power
that the Fourth Amendment was meant to provide.260 Other
commentators have also argued for a new conception of privacy
based more on protecting autonomy of the individual rather
than secrecy of information. 261
Reconceptualizing privacy to favor protection of autonomy
(over secrecy of data for its own sake) could both extend and
257 Solove, supra note 63 at 1133; see also id at 1122 ("after Katz,
the Court shifted to viewing privacy as a form of total secrecy"); Id at 1131,
1136, 1152.
258 See generally Solove, supra note 63; Taslitz, supra note 131.
259 CL Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1523 ("The more
commonplace that ubiquitous surveillance becomes, the less the Fourth
Amendment will be able to protect the average citizen."). Additionally, could
expectation, for purposes of the Katz test, then be subject to overt
manipulation? Could, for example, the government widely disseminate
information on a new intrusive technology prior to its employ, thus
undermining any credible claim to either subjective or objective expectation
of privacy thereafter?
260 See Solove, supra note 63, at 1117-38.
261 Cf, e.g., Alfino, supra note 70 at 6, ("Privacy plays a
fundamental and ineliminable role in constructing personal autonomy.");
Cohen, supra note 120 at 1377, 1425 (arguing for "zones of personal
autonomy," within which the individual can develop and make autonomous
"decisions about speech, belief, and political and intellectual association").
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restrict the domain of privacy. 262 For example, any attempt to
gain information to interfere with an individual's rationale
choice, i.e., their autonomy, could be held to implicate their
privacy (whether or not the data was secret) and thus trigger
whatever appropriate procedural or legal protections might
exist.26 3 On the other hand, clandestine surveillance (or data
analysis) of which the individual is unaware and through which
they are not subject to any additional consequence, might not be
considered to implicate privacy at all since such surveillance has
no affect on autonomy. 264 It is beyond the scope of this article to
fully explore these issues.
Nevertheless, the salient point is that a more
sophisticated or nuanced view of privacy - for example, one
based on protecting individual autonomy, not data secrecy for its
own sake - provides opportunities to build technical information
systems designed to protect core privacy interests while still
improving security.26 5 Autonomy can be protected by separating
knowledge (or observation) of behavior from knowledge (or
discovery) of identity - in effect, using a form of procedurally
protected anonymity to protect autonomy, nee privacy. Thus,
strategies based on protecting what I have called the privacy
divide (that is, the point where data attribution occurs) by
building in procedural interventions through anonymization or
pseudonymization can help protect these core privacy interests
in privacy while still meeting legitimate law enforcement and
national security needs. 266
262 Alfino, supra note 70.
263 That is, whatever combination of administrative, legislative
and judicial protections that develops. Cf e.g., Solove, supra note 63, at
1151-67 (describing reconstructing a new "architecture of power" based on a
fusion of constitutional and statutory protections).
264 Cf the approach of the EU Directive, supra note 129, where
processing itself may be considered a privacy violation.
265 Cf generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1126-1155 (2002) (discussing the complexity of
conceptualizing privacy but arguing for a more contextual based approach).
266 See K. A. Taipale, Presentation at the Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies, The Politics and Law of Identity and Identification in the
Context of the War on Terror, Arlington, VA, at slides 13-16 (Jan. 28, 2004),
available at http ://www.taipale .org/presentations/CAS-IDsystem s-012804.pdf.
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VIII. THE PRIVACY DIVIDE
Reconciling competing interests in the privacy-security
debate requires determining under what circumstances (and
following what procedures) identity is to be associated with
behavior or behavior with identity. 26 7 This section explores the
privacy divide - that point within systems and security
processes where attribution of behavior and identity occurs, and
argues that the key to developing new information technologies
and systems that can provide improved security while still
protecting privacy is to design systems that allow for procedural
intervention and control at that point.
The question for both policy and information systems
development is when and under what circumstances certain
data attribution is to occur - that is, when is an entity or
identifier to be attributed to a data collection (or its related
attributes) or, conversely, when is a data collection (or its
related attributes) to be attributed to an identifier or entity.26 8
Simply put, when is an individual to be associated with data
representing their behavior or, conversely, when is behavior
(whether observed by physical surveillance or within data) to be
attributed to a specific individual.
Traditionally, the security purpose for using identification
technologies and systems is to attribute an individual to (or
associate an individual with) an identifier or identity in order to
grant authority or provide accountability. 26 9 However, technical
means exist to prove authorization (for example, through third
party certification) and to provide accountability (for example,
through identity escrow) without necessarily disclosing
individual identity at the point of verification while still meeting
either (or both) security needs. 270
Likewise, data analysis, including pattern- analysis and
pattern-matching, is used to attribute (or associate) behavior or
transaction records (suspicious links or patterns) to an
267 In this section, I use identity in its more common form to
mean the identification of a particular individual. Cf the discussion in Part
VII.A. supra.
268 See generally supra Part VII.A.
269 See text accompanying supra note 147.
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individual for further investigation. 271  Similarly, traditional
surveillance technologies, for example video cameras in public
places, are used to attribute observed behavior to an individual
for follow-up investigation (or to record behavior for later
accountability).272 In both of these cases as well, system design
can provide intervention points for legal or policy procedures to
control the circumstance under which such behavioral analysis
or observation is attributed to a particular individual. Some
form of rule-based processing, either automated or procedural
(or both), can be interposed at the privacy divide, that is, before
identity is attributed to behavior.
A. CONTROLLING THE PRIVACY DIVIDE:
THE PRIVACY APPLIANCE AS METAPHOR
Conceptualizing and designing the appropriate
mechanisms to exert control over the privacy divide is the key
issue for protecting privacy in networked information systems.
The policy challenge is to determine the rules and procedures
governing the divide, and the technical challenge is to build in
technical features to execute or enforce those rules and to
manage accountability.2 7 3 The overall architecture must include
organizational, procedural, and technical features in a
framework that integrates these control requirements within
business process needs.27 4
The notion of a privacy appliance - that is, a technical
systems component sitting between the point of access and the
data itself to enforce rules and provide accountability - has been
suggested. 275  Here I consider the privacy appliance as a
271 See generally, supra Part VII.B.
272 See Froomkin, supra note 99, at 1476-79.
273 See infra Part IX (policy calculus) and Part X (technical
features).
274 See supra note 143 (discussing business process and
enterprise architecture).
275 See Taipale, supra note 13, at 78 n.328, 80. See also TAO
REPORT, supra note 68, at A-13 ("DARPA is examining the feasibility of a
privacy appliance ... to enforce access rules and accounting policy"). For
purposes of this Article I continue to use the term 'privacy' appliance
although in other work I have begun to refer to 'policy' appliances in order to
encompass the broader notion that these mechanisms can be used to enforce
policy rules more generally, including rules for operational security and
information assurance, for example, in addition to meeting privacy needs.
See, e.g., K. A. Taipale, Designing Technical Systems to Support Policy
(Enterprise Architecture, Policy Appliances, and Civil Liberties), in ROBERT
192 2004-2005
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metaphor - an analytic device representing the need for policy
intervention in technical systems to enforce rules - rather than
as a particular technical device or application. As a technical
matter, the privacy appliance might be instantiated as any one
of several different approaches, 276 and its actual form of
implementation is secondary to understanding what business
needs are to be supported.
From a policy perspective, it is not necessary a priori to
decide if the privacy appliance should be a specific piece of
hardware, for example, a firewall, or an application, such as an
analytic filter. The point for policy makers to understand is that
intervention can happen at many different points in the
technical architecture, 277 and can be subject to varying methods
of control.278
For the policy maker, the privacy appliance represent the
technical objects that enforce policy in systems, thus who
controls them (for example, the party using the data, the party
supplying the data, a trusted or untrusted third party) and how
(through direct technical control, automated monitoring, control
of audit or logs) and subject to what general oversight and
review (for example, executive, legislative or judicial) are the
pertinent policy questions.
For the technologist, understanding the policy needs
forms the basis for determining technical requirements.
Together, policy needs and system design form an enterprise
architecture in which the information management, data,
systems, and technology architecture all support the overall
POPP AND JOHN YEN, 21 ST CENTURY ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICIES
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (forthcoming 2005).
276 See Taipale, supra note 13, at 75-78.
277 Intervention can occur both between nodes in a topographical
layout of the network as well as at each layer, for example, at the interface,
authentication, application, transport, or database level, see Taipale, supra
note 143, at slides 28-29; K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security, and Privacy.*
Designing Technical Features to Support Policy, Presentation at the NSF
Science and Technology Center for Discrete & Theoretical Computer Science
(DIMACS)(April 15, 2004) at slides 69-70, available at
http ://www .taipale .or /resentations/CAS-DIMACS .pdf.
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business process needs 279 - in this case, enabling certain
security processes while still protecting privacy interests. 280
This article suggests that technical design strategies that
emphasize anonymization of data for analysis and
pseudonymization of identity for identification and surveillance
systems can provide intervention points where due process
procedures can function. Together with strong user
authentication and audit controls, these strategies can be built
into privacy appliances that mediate between distributed data
sources and the analyst on one hand (for data aggregation and
analysis) and the individual and the data collection on the other
(for identification and collection). Such procedures are
dependant on organizational, structural and technical design
features functioning together to meet articulated policy needs. 28 1
B. ANONYMIZATION OF DATA
An anonymous record or transaction is one in which the
data cannot be associated with a particular individual, either
from the data itself, or by combining the transaction with other
data. 28 2  Here traditional encryption strategies need to be
distinguished from potentially truly anonymous procedures such
as one-way hashing. With traditional encryption strategies data
is encrypted but can be decrypted with the use of a key. An
analogy would be handing over data in a locked box.
Theoretically, encrypted data is not truly anonymous as the
underlying data can be accessed by combining it with the key
(and the key might be acquired by applying brute computational
force or otherwise).
Using one-way hashes, on the other hand, allows data to
be shared "with your worst enemy," as the original data cannot
279 HOWARD SMITH & PETER FINGAR, IT DOESN'T MATTER -
BUSINESS PROCESSES Do (2003).
280 Cf Cohen, supra note 120, at 1436-38 (discussing
informational privacy and technical design choice).
281 Cf Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at (discussing
SHARE network).
282 Roger Clarke, Identified, Anonymous and Pseudonymous
Transactions: The Spectrum of Choice § 3.3, Presented at User Identification




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/6
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
be reconstructed from the hash.28 3 Hashing is a process of
passing data through a one-way algorithm that returns a digital
signature in place of the original data.28 4 This digital signature
is unique to the underlying data but cannot be turned back into
the original data - much like a sausage can be identified as pork
but cannot be turned back into a pig.28 5  One-way hash
technologies allow for anonymous data processing to occur in a
shared environment since the only thing exchanged is the
hash.28 6 If a match occurs, the processing party still needs to
come back to the original data holder to access the underlying
data. This allows organizational and procedural structures to be
imposed between data matching and revelation of identity (or
other sensitive data).
Theoretically, hashing is vulnerable to what is known as a
"dictionary attack" in which an attacker compiles a list of all
potential inputs and computes a hash function for each, then
compares the hashed output from the target data set against
their own list of hashes computed from all possible inputs to
determine if there is a match. 28 7 To counter the dictionary
attack, salt is used. Salt is a random string that is concatenated
to the original data before it is operated on by the hash
function.28 8 In order to match the hashed outputs you need to
share the salt key. Salt keys can be encoded in hardware or
283 See Don Clark, Entrepreneur Offers Solution For Security-
Privacy Clash, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at B:1 (quoting Kim Taipale, "with
data hashing, 'you can hand your data over to your worst enemy and they
don't have anything.") Note, however, the discussion of the use of salt to
prevent "dictionary attacks" infra.
284 Dempsey, supra note 16, at 7.
285 Jeff Jonas, SRD, quoted in Steve Mollman, Betting on Private
Data Search, WIRED MAG., Mar. 5, 2003, available at
http ://www.wired.com/news/technologv/0,1282,57903,oo.html.
286 This also allows the insertion of a trusted or untrusted third
party to provide additional protections. For example, two parties wishing to
data-match a particular data set, for example, a list of names, can give each
give their hashed lists to an independent (trusted or not) third party for
processing rather than exchanging data directly. This allows organizational
structures in which even the identity of the counterparty is unknown.
287 For example, to determine whether a particular hashed value
compares to a specific name, the hacker would compute hashes for all
possible inputs, in this case, all names in the data universe, and then
compare the output with the original hash. If there were a match, the hacker
would look at their own list of inputs and determine the original data. In
addition to using salt to overcome vulnerability to dictionary attacks, systems
can also be designed to fragment data sets for discrete processing.
288 See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 8-9.
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software, can be used to control the domain across which
sharing occurs, and can even be used to control expiration of
data. 289
1. ANONYMIZATION AND SECURITY
Many security needs for data analysis, including watch
list matching and pattern-matching, can be accomplished within
an anonymized data framework. Data analysis, including some
forms of data mining, may also be possible. 290
A simple example of this is illustrated by the following. 29 1
Suppose a primary dataset contains traveler data and a second
dataset contains suspected terrorists. Before the data was
analyzed, both datasets are subject to the same one-way hash
algorithm. Now, identifiers for "Joseph K." in the first dataset
(for example, name, birth date, telephone number, etc.) are
represented by encrypted digital signatures that do not reveal
personal data but can still be exchanged or matched against the
corresponding data in the second set since the matching name or
other identifiers in that database would have a matching "hash"
(digital signature). Should a match occur, the agency would be
required to follow the appropriate administrative or judicial
procedures for that particular use prior to being granted access
to the raw data corresponding to the match held by the original
owner who maintains exclusive control of the actual data
throughout.
As noted above, by controlling the sharing of salt keys
additional policy restrictions can be enforced. Not only can
hashed data not be turned back into the original data, it cannot
be matched or used for any other purpose without a matching
salt key. Thus, control of salt variables allows searches to be
restricted to certain data sets or domains. 292
289 Id.
290 It should be noted that there is a constant tension between
analyzing de-identified data and re-identifying the data, that is, the more
effective a technology is at analyzing de-identified data, the more it is able to
re-identify data without resort to traditional identifiers. Data analysis is, by
definition, the process of making sense of data. Thus, the goal in designing
technical systems is not to maintain absolute secrecy of data but to provide
sufficient layers of abstraction at which due process intervention can occur.
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Beyond simple list matching, more sophisticated link
analysis may also be possible using anonymized data.293
Whether full-scale data analysis, including data mining for
unknown patterns, is possible using (anonymized or otherwise
de-identified) data is a research question.
294
2. DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES
While anonymizing technologies provide privacy
protection they are not dependant on privacy concerns alone for
development. Intelligence agencies themselves have a need to
develop methods for anonymous data transfer and processing in
order to enable the "sharing" of confidential data with untrusted
sources. For example, domestic intelligence or law enforcement
agencies may need to match data with corporate databases (for
example, employee records) without revealing the watch list
names. So too, even among government agencies there is a need
to protect sources and methods (as well as avoiding potential
liability) that precludes sharing raw data. Thus, data
anonymization strategies are not at odds with security - rather,
they serve both privacy and security needs.
C. PSEUDONYMITY
A pseudonymous record or transaction is one that cannot
- in the ordinary course of events - be associated with a
particular individual. 295 Pseudonymity is a form of "traceable
anonymity" and requires legal, organizational or technical
procedures so that the association (that is, the data attribution)
can only be accomplished under specified and controlled
circumstances. Pseudonymity is also referred to as identity
eSc'roW.296
293 See Mollman, supra note 285; Clark, supra note 283.
294 See, e.g., Dawn Song et al., Practical Techniques for Searches
of Encrypted Data, Proc. of IEEE SRSP, May 2000.
295 Clarke, supra note 282.
296 See, e.g., Joe Kilian and Erez Petran, Identity Escrow,
presentation at Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'98: 18th Annual
International Cryptology Conference (H. Krawczyk ed., Aug. 1998) available
at http://www.springerlink.com; Camenisch, infra note 301.
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The use of pseudonyms allows for anonymous but
traceable (or otherwise accountable) identities to be used.297 A
pseudonym can be either transient (used once or for a limited
time) or persistent (used over a period of time). Persistent
pseudonym's develop their own reputational attributes and can
be tracked over time or across systems.298
Pseudonymity allows for the disclosure of only the
particular attribute or data relevant (and appropriate) for the
particular transaction in which an exchange of data is required.
For example, in the use of credit cards, the merchant does not
actually require the purchaser's name to complete the
transaction - only the authorization that American Express will
pay the amount of purchase is relevant to the transaction.
(Whether the cardholder is the authorized user is an
authentication issue unrelated to the transaction specifically
and also does not require revealing a name).299
1. PSEUDONYMITY AND SECURITY
Identification systems are generally used for either
authorization or accountability (or both). Technical means exist
to prove authorization without revealing actually identity by
using third party certification in which a trusted third party
certifies an authorization. The holder of the certificate (digital
or otherwise) then presents the certificate to the second party
(who may still authenticate that the individual is the authorized
user), however, the original party does not have to reveal
297 There are also technical methods to provide for untraceable
pseudonyms, see, e.g., David Chaum, A Cryptographic Invention Known as a
Blind Signature Permits Numbers to Serve as Electronic Cash or to Replace
Conventional Identification, Sci. AM. 96-101 (Aug. 1992) available at
http://www.eff.org/Privacv/Digital money/?f=chaum privacv id.article.txt.
A traceable pseudonym allows for both authorization and
accountability applications. An untraceable pseudonym can provide
authorization (for example, in digital cash applications) but could not be used
for direct accountability. Traceability can be maintained by designing the
pseudonym to resolve to their issuers for subsequent retrieval pursuant to
approved procedures of the underlying identity.
298 Clarke, supra note 282. Persistence is also sometimes called
linkability (allowing individual transactions to be linked).
299 See supra Part VII.A. (discussing how whether a user is the
authorized user could be verified, for example, using a biometric match with
the card without revealing individual identity).
198 2004-2005
76
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/6
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
additional identifiers (or identity) in order for the second party
to grant the level of authorization certified by the third party.300
Technical means also exist to provide accountability
without disclosing identity at the point of verification. Escrowed
identity is a form of third party certification, in which the
trusted third party certifies that they know the "true" identity of
the user.30
1
For example, a pseudonymous driver's license based on
smart card technology30 2 could be designed to only reveal during
a traffic stop that the driver is authorized to drive (for example,
by producing a digital certificate from the DMV certifying the
holder's authorized status) without revealing a common
identifier. The police officer could still run a data match
against, for example, a wanted-felon or terrorist watch list (also
without revealing name) by reading a hashed identifier keyed
(through shared salt) to the felony or watch list database
hashing algorithm. If there were an initial data match then
additional procedures may or may not be called for, however,
without a match, the purpose of the traffic stop could be
accomplished without revealing identity.30 3  The same card
could be designed to only exchange, for example, age information
with a bartender's card reader, or health information with a
medical worker, etc.
An important policy consideration in any such system is
determining whether such pseudonymous encounters are logged
- that is, do they generate their own transaction records. If so,
do such queries become part of the data record subject to
300 Secure third party certification can be accomplished through
public key infrastructure (PKI) systems. See generally Public Key
Infrastructure, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pki.
301 See, e.g., Jan Camenisch & Anna Lysyanskaya, An Identity
Escrow Scheme with Appointed Verifiers, in Advances in Cryptology-
CRYPT02001, 2139 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 388-407.
International Association for Cryptologic Research (Joe Kilian, ed., 2001),
available at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article
&issn=0302-9743&volume=2139&spage=388.
302 A smart card is any pocket-sized device that contains a
processor or microchip that can interact with a reader. See, e.g., Farmer,
supra note 183 (describing how personal data on Malaysia's smart card chips
- designed to replace driver's licenses - are stored in isolated files, each
accessible only to authorized readers for that particular data).
303 The summons could be issued against another certificate from
a third party certifying that they had the needed identifying information if
the driver subsequently needed to be traced.
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whatever policy controls are envisioned. 30 4 As noted earlier, who
controls the logs has policy implications. 30
5
In the example above, in addition to whether there should
be a law enforcement database logging the transaction, there is
also the question of whether the card itself should be designed to
record the encounter. Arguments in favor would emphasize the
empowerment to the individual from an immutable record in
their possession of their encounter with law enforcement and a
specific record of what queries were run. Arguments against
might include that the card record itself becomes a vulnerability
point for privacy - that is, recovery of transaction data from the
card itself could be used against the individual at a later date. 30 6
Identity management, including specifically the use of
anonymous or pseudonymous strategies, is a well-developed
research field. 307 It is beyond the scope of this article to fully
explore technical issues involved in developing these systems.
Nevertheless, the point to be recognized for policy purposes is
that these issues are not unique to intelligence or law
enforcement use in counterterrorism but ubiquitous to resolving
identification issues throughout emerging information
infrastructure and systems. The need to provide authentication
and accountability without disclosing identity (as we
traditionally know it) is fundamental to further development of
an effective and efficient networked information-based society.
Pseudonymity gives policy makers an additional method
to control disclosure of identity. For example, in Hiibe] v.
Nevada,,3° the issue was whether a suspect could be compelled
304 Cf the Fair Credit Reporting Act where queries to a credit
report become part of the report and are themselves subject to the Act. See
note 233 supra.
305 See supra Part VI.C..
306 Evidence is already being collected from E-Zpass, Metrocard,
and cell tower records, see e.g., Tresa Baldas, High Tech Evidence, THE NAT'L
L.J. (Aug. 16, 2004) available at
http://www.law.com/sp/article.jsp?id=1090180376956; Adam L. Penenberg,
The Surveillance Society, WIRED MAG. Dec. 2001, available at
http:i/www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/surveillance pr~html.
307 See generally Liberty Alliance Web Site at
http://www.projectliberty.orgi. Identity management is generally concerned
with authentication of identity, and authorization and accountability for (or
non-repudiation of) behavior within or across systems.
308 Hiibel v. Nevada, 124 S.Ct. 2451 (2004).
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to give their name during a Terry stop.30 9 Among the arguments
put forward against disclosure of name was that in today's
database world, disclosing one's name is the key to unlocking
the digital dossier and may lead to "an extensive fishing trip
across government databases." 310 One of the arguments in favor
of disclosure is the legitimate interest to determine whether the
individual is wanted or dangerous. "Obtaining a suspect's name
in the course of a Terry stop serves important government
interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence
or mental disorder."311
Information systems based on pseudonymity, including
the use of smart ID cards, can provide another alternative to
meet these same needs. As noted in the example above, there
are technical methods for an individual to be matched against a
watch list (or any other list) without revealing explicit
identifying data. Thus, development of a national ID card based
on segmented data and pseudonymous identities could improve
privacy over existing methods and still meet security needs. 312
The Transportation Safety Administration has recently
begun testing of a program in which registered travelers
(sometimes also referred to as trusted travelers) are not subject
to additional random checks based on having previously
submitted to a background check.313 The privacy lobby has
opposed this program on a variety of grounds. 314 Nevertheless,
the same system could be employed while still providing
additional privacy protections by employing pseudonymous
strategies, where individually identifying data would not need to
309 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police can
detain a suspect for a reasonable period without reasonable cause to suspect
a crime).
310 See Brief of Amice Curiae of Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts at 6, Hiibel v.
Nevada, 124 S.Ct. 2451, available at http:i/wwwepicorg/privaeyi
hiibel/epic amicus.pdf.
311 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
312 An example of such a card is described in Farmer, supra note
183. But see Froomkin, supra note 146; Sobel, supra note 146 (discussing
issues relating to a national ID card).
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be revealed at the point of verification but watch list matching
could still occur.3 15
2. DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVE
Pseudonymous technologies also have a development
imperative separate from privacy and related to security
generally. For example, developing pseudonymous transaction
technologies and implementation architectures will be needed to
enable secure online voting. Secure online voting will require
maintaining ballot (user identity) secrecy but authenticating the
right to vote (and preventing multiple votes). Additionally,
various online payment systems 316 and federated identity
management systems 317 architectures could be adapted to
enable pseudonymous transactions and access to data.
IX. TOWARDS A CALCULUS OF REASONABLENESS.
Assuming that anonymization and pseudonymization
strategies are employed to separate identity from behavior (or
data), and control over data attribution is enforced through
privacy appliances, the policy issue still remains when and
under what circumstances particular methods of inquiry might
be used on specific data sets, and when and under what
circumstances data attribution may occur. This section
examines some of the variables that need to be considered.
It is not my intent in this section to recommend specific
confidence intervals, predicates or oversight regimes for use of
identification, data aggregation and automated analysis, or
collection technologies in any particular application or by any
particular agency but only to illustrate the interaction among
certain relationships and issues that may be relevant in devising
315 Only hashed identifiers are matched, and authorization for
travel authenticated.
316 For example, American Express Blue, Amazon Marketplace,
and PayPal each use forms of third party authorization that could be adapted
to enable pseudonymous transactions. Additionally, research on so-called
digital cash is relevant. See, e.g., Chaum, supra note 297; Tatsuo Tanaka,
Possible Economic Consequences of Digital Cash, 1 FIRST MONDAY 2 (Aug 5,
1996) athttp://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue2/digital cash/
317 Federated identity refers to the use of a single authentication
of identity to suffice for access across multiple trusted systems.
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procedural guidelines, technical standards, or oversight
structures in any particular context.
It is the general thesis of this section that procedural
mechanisms relate to the concept of reasonableness (both in
Fourth Amendment terms and as that term is more generally
understood) through a complex policy calculus involving
multiple independent and dependent variables that must be
understood individually but considered together and in
context. 318 Thus, guiding principles, not rigid standards to be
determined a priori for every conceivable use, condition or
context, must be derived within which specific administrative
procedures, legislative oversight, and judicial intervention and
review can be fashioned.
There is some policy function, f, where reasonableness is
a derivative of confidence interval, predicate, consequence, and
procedure for error correction, (together, "due process") and
scope of access, sensitivity of data, and method of query
("privacy/security" trade-off) as they relate to threat ("threat").
Policy guidelines are required to define the limits of and express
the relationship among the due process, privacy and security,
and threat variables.
f reasonableness = due process - privacy l security
threat
This is not intended to imply that there exists a formulaic
policy outcome that can be pre-determined and simplistically
applied in any circumstance. Rather, the construct of such a
theoretical equation is used to illustrate the relationship among
the issues to be discussed in this section.
A. DUE PROCESS
Due process is the means for ensuring fairness in a
system. 319 Due process is essentially a function of four factors:
the reasonableness of the predicate for action, the praetiea]ity of
318 Cf United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) ("the
whole picture -- must be taken into account").
319 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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alternatives, the severity and consequences of the intrusion, and
the procedures for error control.3 20
1. PREDICATE
Determining the appropriateness of predicate requires
understanding error rates and assessing related confidence
intervals - that is, it requires determining the probative weight
of the indices of suspicion. 321 Confidence interval for policy
purposes is simply the acceptable error rate for a given
application. 322 As discussed above, for example, the confidence
interval for a screening application can be viewed as a function
of two competing relationships - the number of false positives
(innocents identified) adjusted by the severity of the
consequences to the individual and the number of the false
negatives (terrorists not identified) adjusted by the
consequences to security (and by the potential misallocation of
resources from false positives).323 Determining acceptable
confidence intervals for any particular application requires
assessing the probative value of the predicate procedures - for
example, determining whether the observed behavior (or data




The Supreme Court has also explicitly recognized that the
requirement for individualized suspicion is not an "irreducible
requirement" 325 and the practicality of requiring either a
warrant or individualized suspicion needs to be considered. In
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,326 the Court noted that where
the government interest serves a need beyond routine law
enforcement, the practicality of requiring individualized
suspicion is also a relevant factor:
320 Cf id.
321 See supra notes 214-223 and accompanying text.
322 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.104 discussing technical
aspects of confidence intervals for decision making in knowledge discovery
systems.
323 See supra Part VI.A.
324 See supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text.
325 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976).
326 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
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[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the
individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular
context. 327 (emphasis added)
The Court has used the same special-needs reasoning in
upholding the use of sobriety checkpoints,328 roving border
checkpoints, 329 and random drug testing of student athletes. 330
Likewise, policy makers should consider the practicality (or
impracticality) of requiring specific procedures or individualized
predicate in cases of information processing systems for use in
counter-terrorism. 331
3. SEVERITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTRUSION
Another important factor to be considered is the
reasonableness of the intrusion. "The reasonableness of a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate government
interests."332 Thus, where there is an important state interest,
and the intrusion minimal and the consequences slight - for
example, a brief stop and referral to a secondary inspection or
minimal questioning - the courts are likely to find no Fourth
Amendment violation. 333  In upholding roving traffic
checkpoints in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court stated:
327 Id. At 665-66
328 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
329 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
330 Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
331 Compare Separate Statement of William T. Coleman in
TAPAC Report, supra note 90, at 67, with Separate Statement of Floyd
Abrams, id. at 63. Coleman argues that requiring certain predicate
authorizations and procedures is impractical for use in automated
information systems in the war on terror.
332 Hiibe], 124 S.Ct. 298, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
648, 654 (1979).
333 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
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Against this valid public interest we must weigh
the interference with individual liberty that results
when an officer stops an automobile and questions
its occupants. The intrusion is modest. The
Government tells us that a stop by a roving patrol
''usually consumes no more than a minute." There
is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the
visual inspection is limited to those parts of the
vehicle that can be seen by anyone standing
alongside. According to the Government, "[a]ll that
is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response
to a brief question or two and possibly the
production of a document evidencing a right to be
in the United States. 334
Thus, a legitimate inquiry for policy makers is to
determine the severity and consequence of a particular intrusion
in light of the state interest. 335 Where there is a significant state
interest (for example, preempting terrorist attacks), minimal
initial intrusion (for example, an automated review of data), and
limited consequences (for example, a routine investigative
follow-up that may only include cross-checking against
additional data), the courts are likely to uphold the use of
advanced information systems to screen data.336
4. ERROR CORRECTION
Reasonableness in this context also requires examining
procedures for error detection and correction. Determining
confidence levels means recognizing the potential for errors. "No
system constructed by man is perfect. The only certainty is that
there will be false positives - both in investigations and
possibly (though less likely) in the mistaken imposition of
collateral consequences on a misidentified subject."337 Thus, an
334 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-880 (citations omitted).
335 See Rosenzweig, supra note 71, at 677-85.
336 Note that in the context of an arrest, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that even the drawing of blood constitutes only a
minimally intrusive search, see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
489 U.S.602, 625 (1989) (blood tests do not "infringe significant privacy
interests"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 62 (1985) (not "an unduly extensive
imposition"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)
("commonplace"); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 36 (1957) ("routine" and
"would not be considered offensive by even the most delicate").
337 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 191-95.
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integral part of policy as well as system design is to recognize
the potential for error and build in error detection and error
correction procedures. 338
Error, however, including falsely identifying suspects
(false positives), is not unique to information systems. Thus, to
the extent possible, error detection and error correction
procedures for automated systems should embrace existing
procedures. 339
Additional complications arise, however, when one
considers systems in which the subject may never become aware
of the intrusion or the consequences of the query. In access
control situations where permission for access is denied, the
individual is on notice that their autonomy has been affected
and corrective procedures can be triggered. More difficult is the
situation where the data subject never becomes aware of the
query or its consequences. 340
Also unresolved is whether derived data (that is, data
generated from the query or analysis process) or other meta-
data (data about the data that is attached to the data, for
example, data labels) becomes part of the record and whether it
too becomes subject to applicable laws that the underlying data
may be subject to.341
B. PRIVACY AND SECURITY INFORMATION NEEDS
This section briefly examines the relationship between
privacy and security information needs. In particular, it
describes how seope, sensitivity and method of query implicate
certain privacy and security considerations.
338 See id. C£ supra note 166 (discussing problems with watch
lists).
339 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 191-195.
340 For example, a job applicant may never know they were
denied a job because they were on a watch list.
341 Compare the treatment of private credit reports, where
inquiries themselves become part of the report and subject to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Even national security
investigations are subject to disclosure under the Act once the investigation is
concluded. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b FCRA §604(b)(4)(B).
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1. SCOPE OF ACCESS
Obviously, foreign intelligence, counter intelligence and
law enforcement information is and should be available for
appropriate domestic security purposes. The policy challenge lies
in determining when and under what circumstance domestic
intelligence access should be allowed to routinely-collected
government data or to commercially available (or other third
party) data.
34 2
Routinely collected data - that is, government held data
collected in the normal course of providing government services
- is generally subject to restriction for other uses or data
matching by the Privacy Act of 1974. 343 However, the Privacy
Act has broad exceptions for data matching and inter-agency
sharing for national security and law enforcement purposes,
344
thus, for practical purposes there are no restrictions on use for
342 See generally Solove, supra note 63; Second Markle Report,
supra note 23, at 30-37.
Note that privately held data (i.e., data not generally available to
third parties or where access is restricted by statute), which is the most
sensitive and requires the greatest protection under existing doctrine, is
already protected to some extent under the procedural due process regimes
applicable to methods of its collection, for example, judicial and statutory
rules and procedures required for use of wire taps (Title III (governing
electronic surveillance), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 et seq. (2003), as amended by
the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001)), for accessing stored
electronic data (Electronic Communications Privacy Act (governing access to
stored communications), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2003), as amended by the
USA PATRIOT Act), or for searching personal computer drives, storage
media, or other physical assets. Once lawfully acquired under the
appropriate procedures, this previously privately held data is then either
foreign or counter-intelligence data (for example, if it is collected under
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (providing a separate regime for "foreign intelligence"), 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1811, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act) or law enforcement data
(for example, if it is collected pursuant to a lawful warrant).
343 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended. The Privacy
Act also contains certain procedural restriction on "matching" information
from several government databases and for sharing data among agencies,
requiring certain inter-agency agreements. See The Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100"503, § 1, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988)
(appears as a note amending the Privacy Act in 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2003).
344 The Privacy Act contains exemptions for both computer
matching and for inter-agency data sharing for national security and law
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domestic security applications. 345  One policy question is
whether there should be any additional procedural protections
or guidelines for use of routinely-collected government data that
subsequently come within the national security and law
enforcement exceptions.
The more difficult question, however, involves deciding
whether government should have access to, and use of, privately
held third party data, particularly data from commercial data
sources, and, if so, under what circumstances and what
constraints. 346
That the government should, and will ultimately, have
access to this data seems foregone. 347 As already noted, it would
be an unusual polity that demanded accountability from its
representatives to prevent terrorist acts yet denied them access
to available tools or information. Thus, it is the procedures
under which such access should be allowed that need to be
defined. 348 Here, developing clear goals and concomitant policy
guidelines, requiring that the nexus between particular types of
information and its use and value for counter-terrorism be
clearly articulated, 349 and mandating strict oversight and review
procedures, are needed to ensure that appropriate government
access to potentially useful information is possible in a way that
protects civil liberties.
Among the policy tools for dealing with access questions is
the use of categorization to designate certain information
sources or types subject to (or exempt from) particular
procedures. For example, under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD-6) certain information is to be
345 But see Sean Fogarty & Daniel R. Ortiz, Limitations Upon
Interagency Information Sharing: The Privacy Act of 1974, in First Markle
Report, supra note 21, at 127-132.
346 See Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 30-37; Solove,
supra note 63.
347 See generally Federal Bureau of Investigation, Guidance
Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or
Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (Sep. 17, 2001) available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/cpfcimemo.pdf; see also Solove,
supra note 63, at 1089 ("criminal investigations often require the gathering of
data from third parties"); Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 31-2 ("We
... start from the premise that government must have access to [private
sector data]").
348 See Solove, supra note 63, at 1151-67 (outlining an
architecture of power based on a constitutional and statutory framework).
349 See Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 31-32.
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classified as "Terrorist Information" and provided to TTIC. 350
Under the Executive Order for Sharing Terrorism Information
certain requirements and procedures are to be applied to
"terrorism information."351 The Second Markle Report suggests
that government should take steps to "concretely identify its
true information needs" by identifying what private sector
information is needed for "the government to carry out its
350 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, 39 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1234-1235 (Sept. 16, 2003) (outlining procedures for
integrating information about individuals who are known or suspected
terrorists within the Terrorist Threat Integration Center ("TTIC"), the all-
source intelligence fusion and analysis center announced by the President in
January 2003. See White House Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to
Protect America, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/01/20030128-12.html. TTIC's role and responsibilities are set out in the
classified Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 2/4 (effective May
1, 2003)). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TERRORIST
IDENTIFICATION, SCREENING AND TRACKING UNDER HOMELAND SECURITY
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 6 (Congressional Research Service 2004); Daniel
Gallington, The New Presidential Directive on "Screening" Terrorist
Information, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Waypoint Issue Paper
(Oct. 6, 2003); Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 19 (suggesting that
HSPD-6 and TTIC may have "radically changed the balance of liberties"
without "significant public debate on this fundamental question [i.e.,
maintaining the U.S. person distinction]");
But cl Daniel Gallington, Better Information Sharing and More
Privacy in the War on Terrorism - A New Category of Information is Needed,
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Waypoint Issue Paper (Jul. 29, 2003),
available at http ://www.potomacinstitute.orgiresearch/072903
project guardian.cfm; Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Oversight of
Terrorist Threat Information: A Proposal (June 25, 2003), available at
http:i/www.sainc.com/tapaclibrary/sept29/Guardian Proposal 0703.pdf
351 Exec. Order No. 13,356 (Aug. 27, 2004) 69 Fed Reg. 53599
(Sep. 1, 2004), at§ 6(d).
The term "terrorism information" means all
information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by
intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or
other United States Government activities, relating to (i) the
existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or
activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or
individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in
transnational terrorism; (ii) threats posed by such groups or
individuals to the United States, United States persons, or
United States interests, or to those of other nations; (iii)
communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (iv)
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably
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homeland security responsibilities." 352 Additionally, it has been
suggested that existing categorization procedures, for example,
the classified procedures used in managing SIGINT, could be
adopted for commercial data space. 353 However, all of these
procedures require pre-determining what information is
relevant - something that may not always be possible in
counter-terrorism analysis.
Further, certain existing categorizations may not be
appropriate for these new circumstances. For example, the
procedures used under USSID-18 to manage SIGINT require
additional exceptional procedures for handling information
relating to U.S. persons (i.e., minimization). 354  This same
arbitrary designation (arbitrary in the sense that it is a legal
categorization, not an attribute of the data) relating to
nationality has also been used in various Congressional acts
purporting to limit the use of certain technologies or techniques
to non-U.S. citizens only.355 The problem with these approaches
arises when one considers the information space and data that is
now available for analysis.
Historically, information in data sets collected in foreign
intelligence operations related primarily to foreigners and U.S.
data could be handled by exception. The information data sets
that are being contemplated here - civilian transaction space -
are essentially U.S. person-centric (or co-mingle data in such a
way that makes it technically difficult, if not impossible, to
separate out U.S. person data for handling as an exception) and
therefore require the development of procedures based on a
general rule, not by reference to the exception.
Note that the Second Markle Report also concludes that
the "distinguishing line between domestic and foreign threats is
increasingly difficult to sustain ... [requiring] new rules - rules
352 Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 31"32.
353 Securing Freedom and the Nation: Collecting Intelligence
Under the Law Before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, 108th Cong. 41 (2003) (statement of Daniel Gallington, Senior
Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies).
354 NSA/CSS United States Signal Intelligence Directive 18
("USSID 18") (July 27, 1993), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07 -01.htm.
355 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.28.
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to replace the old 'line at the border' for information
collection and use."35
6
Thus, any policy based on procedures for pre-designating
information as relevant for counter-terrorism needs to address
these issues: first, recognizing that some information may only
be identifiable as relevant in the context of an ongoing
investigation or in response to a particular threat not a priori;3
57
second, that designations based on place, method of collection or
nationality of subject may be outmoded in the context of a
worldwide, distributed, networked database environment, thus,
requiring more flexible standards based on or anticipating
changing data mixes and different circumstances of initial
collection; and, third, that classifying data into categories that
do not relate to the purpose of the original data collection may
not be possible post collection. 35 8  In any case, use of
categorization or other designation requires that some technical
means for data-labeling be built into systems. 359
With respect to the U.S. person problem specifically, to
the extent that technical means can be used to protect privacy
they may need to be applied to all data - thus affording the
highest protection to everyone - with subsequent identification
of foreign or terrorist related information being treated as the
exception, subject to procedures that selectively reveal
additional information, including identity, based on an iterative
analysis that increases the particular suspicion, thus predicate,
with each pass. Privacy then becomes the norm (protected for
everyone through data anonymization) rather than being
something exceptional granted to particular data categories (for
example, minimization of U.S. persons post collection or
processing); and disclosure (determined by policy and controlled
through selective revelation or selective attribution by privacy
356 Second Markle Report, supra note 23, at 18.
357 Any rules limiting analysis or access to particular information
should recognize that information may only become relevant during the
process of analysis or investigation and should therefore contain "hot pursuit"
exceptions or procedures.
358 For example, if nationality is not required for the transaction
that generates the data, it may not be possible after the fact to determine if it
is U.S. person data or not.
359 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.76-77 and accompanying text.
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appliances) becomes the exception subject to appropriate
authorization or due process procedures. 360
2. SENSITIVITY OF DATA
Specific statutes already exist that protect particular
classes of information deemed sensitive. These statutes
generally require that use of these types of information conform
to particular procedures. For example, census data, medical
records, educational records, tax returns, cable television
records, video rental, etc. are all subject to their own statutory
protection, usually requiring an elevated level of predicate, for
example, a warrant or court order based on probable cause
instead of a subpoena based on mere suspicion, to gain access. 36 1
Although some of these designations may need review in the
context of domestic security, the general approach of dealing
with particularly sensitive personal data by providing additional
procedural protections is sound and can be applied to
identification, data aggregation and analysis, and collection
systems. Technical features, for example, data labeling
discussed below, need to be developed to enable data
360 Making privacy the default state might also help eliminate
problems in sharing data with other jurisdictions. Cf e.g., Ryan Singel, EU
Travel Privacy Battle Heats Up, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 22, 2003).
361 For example, U.S. Census data is protected under 13 U.S.C. §
9 (2003); certain medical records collected for research purposes under 42
U.S.C. § 242(m) (2003); educational records under 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2003)
(but see USA PATRIOT Act amendments, 20 U.S.C. 1232(g)-(j)); and tax
records under The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1590
(1976). With respect to state governments, the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2003), regulates the use and disclosure of
personal information from state motor vehicle records. There is a broad
exemption for use by any government agency, including law enforcement, for
use in carrying out its functions. There are also a number of sector specific
laws restricting the collection, use or disclosure of personal information by
private sources. Among these, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1681-1681v (2003), regulates the use of information by credit reporting
agencies, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2003),
prohibits the disclosure of video rental records, the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2003), limits disclosure of cable television
subscriber data, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222
(2003), limits the use and disclosure of customer proprietary network
information. Additionally, individually identifiable health information is
protected by the Standards for the Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2003) pursuant to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d) (Dept. of
Health and Human Services 2003).
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categorization to be maintained when data is shared or
exchanged. 362
Policy decisions to designate higher standards for
sensitive information or declaring certain information "off-
limits" involve the same considerations that are necessary to
pre-designate certain information or sources as relevant for
counter-terrorism analysis. Additionally, there may be a trade-
off between the sensitivity of information and its relevance for
counter-terrorism that must be taken into account when such
designations are made. If it turns out that certain information
deemed sensitive by its nature, for example, financial records, is
also quite specifically useful for counter-terrorism (for example,
following the money trail), choice of policies (and technical
features to support such choice) need to be developed taking
both needs into account. 36 3
3. METHOD OF QUERY
As previously noted, there is no absolute constitutional
requirement for individualized suspicion, 36 4 and no inherent or
presumptive constitutional problem with pattern-matching. 36 5
Nevertheless, for purposes of determining policy, it may be
appropriate to recognize that different procedures may be
appropriate for different query methods depending, for example,
on whether they are subject-, link- or pattern-based.
Subject- and link-based queries generally raise the same
issues as outlined above in the general discussion of scope - that
is, what data can be accessed and under what circumstance. For
some, pattern-matching may or may not also raise additional
issues relating to its particularization depending on its efficacy
in any particular application. 366
Thus, there may be a legitimate policy question as to
whether there should be additional technical or procedural
protections applied for pattern-based queries based on the
362 See Taipale, supra note 13, at n.76-77 and accompanying text
(describing data labeling technologies).
363 Reconciling competing business process needs is fundamental
to designing appropriate systems architectures.
364 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976);
see also Part VII.B.2.
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perception that these methods are more intrusive. Some have
recommended that such additional procedures be used for
processes using pattern-analysis derived from "data-mining."' 367
If such policies are desired, technical features to support
implementation, such as methods for selective revelation,
anonymizing data, and pseudonymizing identity to ameliorate
concerns related to non-particularized scrutiny of personal data,
will be required. 368 These technical features would allow for
judicial, administrative, or other procedural intervention before
disclosure (or attribution) of identity or other personal
information and would thus help protect individual autonomy
through legal due process.
4. SUMMARY: SCOPE, METHOD AND SENSITIVITY
There is no magic policy formulation that perfectly
balances the variables discussed in this section. What is
required then is an analytic framework, together with guiding
principles, that can inform the public debate as these issues
come up in varying contexts as new technologies develop and
challenge existing doctrine or precepts. Judicious distinction
between when rules (what you can do), procedures (how you can
do something) and guidelines (constraints or limits within which
you act to accomplish some goal) are appropriate requires
understanding the dynamic character of the problem and the
complex nature of the variables, as well as recognizing the
inchoate nature of any solutions given the rapid pace of
technological development and the evolving nature of the threat.
Further, these complexities and the wide variety of
divergent interests involved and views expressed highlights the
need for policy makers and technology systems developers to
develop a shared common language for policy needs and
technical requirements.
C. THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND REASONABLENESS
Reasonableness (including acceptable error rates) may
also vary depending on the threat level and the particular
security need. System bias towards more false positives and less
367 TAPAC Report, supra note 90; Rosenzweig, supra note 13.
368 These methods are discussed in this Article and in Taipale,
supra note 13, at n.74-81 and accompanying text.
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false negatives may be appropriate (and reasonable) under
certain high threat conditions or in applications requiring high
security. 369 In other circumstances, system bias towards fewer
false positives and more false negatives may be appropriate.
Policy considerations are also domain dependent. For
example, decision heuristics used for the development of
traditional defense systems are generally inappropriate for
domestic security applications. In designing military defenses,
the bias is to eliminate any false negatives by accepting
additional false positives. On the battlefield, it is better to have
a low threshold for triggering a response, say donning a gas
mask, then to risk not being prepared. However, in the context
of a civilian population, false positives may be as destructive of
certain values (including security) as are false negatives by
undermining trust in the system or creating intolerable burdens.
Too many false positives and the resulting misallocation of
resources will undermine both popular and political support for
security measures as well as impact security itself37 0
Thus, because of the dynamic nature of the threat and the
changing security requirements, no system (technical or
procedural) should be contemplated that is either constantly at
ease or constantly at general quarters. Flexible systems and
policy guidelines that can adapt proportionally to perceived
threats faster and more efficiently are required.
At the same time, it seems premature to burden either
policy development or technical research and development with
a requirement to determine a priori what policy rules will apply
in every conceivable case. 371 Technical development processes
are not generally amenable to predictable development paths
where ongoing research is in its early stages. An iterative
process using value sensitive design procedures can help guide
technical and policy development to achieve both required
369 Cf Rosenzweig, supra note 71, at 677-85.
370 See generally Taipale, Losing the War, supra note 25; and
supra notes 25 and 29.
371 Cf ACLU, TOTAL INFORMATION COMPLIANCE: THE TIA's
BURDEN UNDER THE WYDEN AMENDMENT, 6 (2003), available at
http ://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfrn?I-D=12650&c=206
(suggesting that rules and technical capabilities need to be determined prior
to research and development efforts that are intended specifically to
determine feasibility and required rules).
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outcomes - security and privacy. However, achieving this
outcome requires joint participation, not knee-jerk opposition.
Nevertheless, guiding policy principles can be developed
even without knowing all the potential technologically enabled
opportunities or constraints based on a deeper understanding of
business process needs and how policy and technical features
interact. Policy then develops rules of general applicability that
are supported by technical architecture, while judicial review
examines cases of specific application according to traditional
notions of due process.
X. CONCLUSION
New technologies do not determine human fates; rather,
they alter the spectrum of potentialities within which people
act. 372 Advanced information technologies have the potential to
help allocate domestic security and law enforcement resources
more effectively. In particular, developing certain technical
architectures may preclude opportunity for certain crimes to
take place in the first place373 and other technologies may enable
preemptive allocation of resources to prevent future occurrences
of crime. 374
A. BUILDING IN TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS
It is the premise of this article that disaggregating
privacy into identity and behavior for analytic purposes, and
designing technical systems to help manage the circumstances
of attribution, can help achieve a practical resolution to the
apparent conflict between privacy-security interests.
This Article has argued that anonymization and
pseudonymization strategies designed to control data attribution
at the privacy divide can significantly mitigate privacy concerns
in the context of certain domestic security and law enforcement
372 ROBERT MCCLINTOCK & K. A. TAIPALE, EDUCATING AMERICA
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, INSTITUTE FOR LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES 2 (1994),
a vailable at http :i/www.taip ale.org/ilt/ILTplan.html.
373 See also Katyal, Digital Architecture, supra note 137; Taipale,
supra note 137.
374 See generally Taipale, supra note 13; see also Robert Popp, et
a]., Countering Terrorism Through Information Technology, 47 COMM. OF THE
ACM 36 (Mar. 2004).
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applications by enabling existing legal doctrines and related
procedures to function within technical systems.
Systems requirements (and related technologies) to
support these strategies include :375
rule-based processing and a distributed database
architecture, which can limit the scope of inquiry
and the subsequent use of data within policy
guidelines;
selective revelation, which can be used to control
the attribution of observed behavior and identity
(or identity with behavior or data); and
strong credential and audit features, and
diversified authorization and oversight, which can
make misuse and abuse "difficult to achieve and
easy to uncover."
376
Rule-based processing technologies include the use of
intelligent agents to query distributed databases according to
pre-determined rules, and data labeling to ensure appropriate
processing when data is exchanged and include research in proof
carrying code, data labeling (DRM), and analytic filtering
tools. 377
Selective revelation technologies include research in
entity resolution, searching on encrypted data, and one-way
hashing technologies. 378 Strong credential and auditing requires
developing immutable logging and self-reporting data.
379
Additional development requirements include a common
language for expressing privacy and other policy rules across
systems, general computer and network security, user
authentication, encryption and compliance checking and
reporting technologies. 380
Further, this article contends that developing these
features for use in domestic security applications will lead to
significant opportunities to enhance overall privacy protection
375 Taipale, supra note 13, at 74.
376 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 196-97.
377 Taipale, supra note 13, at 75-78.
378 Taipale, supra note 13, at 79-80.
379 Taipale, supra note 13, at 80.
380 Taipale, supra note 13, at 81.
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more broadly in the U.S. (and elsewhere) by making these
technical procedures and supporting features available for
voluntary or legislated adoption in the private sector. In
addition, the development of these technologies will have
significant beneficial "spill-over" uses for commercial and
scientific applications, including improved information
infrastructure security (better user authentication, encryption,
and network security), protection of intellectual property
(through rule-based processing), and the reduction or
elimination of spam (through improved analytic filtering).
Other economic sectors that stand to benefit from developments
in these technologies include bioinformatics and pharmaceutical
design, medical research, corporate knowledge management,
environmental resource management, basic science, and others
requiring the management of vast data volumes that may or
may not include sensitive data.
B. OVERRIDING PRINCIPLES
Development and use by government of advanced
identification, aggregation and analysis, and collection
technologies in domestic security applications raise legitimate
privacy and related civil liberties concerns. Nevertheless, such
development and use is inevitable and strategies premised on
opposition to research or banning certain uses or deployments
through law alone are destined to fail, and, in any case, provide
little security and brittle privacy protection. Protecting civil
liberties in an information-based society requires that value
sensitive development strategies be used to design technical
systems that include features that enable familiar due process
mechanisms and related procedures to function, in particular by
providing intervention before attribution of identity with data
(or data with identity) occurs.
This article proffers certain guiding principles for the
development and use of these technologies, particular in the
context of their use in preemptive counterterrorism applications:
First, automated predictive or screening technologies
should be used only as investigative, and not evidentiary, tools.
That is, they should be used as predicates for further
investigation and not to provide proof of guilt. Moreover, their
use should be restricted to investigations of activities about
which there is a political consensus that aggressive preventative
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strategies are appropriate (for example, in the realms of counter-
terrorism and national security).
Second, specific implementations should be subject to
congressional authorization, oversight and review. Executive
agencies that employ these technologies should adopt
appropriate administrative procedures to control their use. And,
judicial review should be available in accordance with existing
due process doctrines.
Third, specific technical features should be developed and
built into the technologies to protect privacy by providing
opportunities for existing doctrines of due process and related
procedures to function effectively. These features include rule-
based processing, selective revelation, and secure credentialing
and tamper-proof audit functions.
C. IN SUM
Reconciling competing requirements for security and
privacy requires an informed debate in which the nature of the
problem is better understood in the context of the interests at
stake, the technologies at hand for resolution, and the existing
resource constraints. Key to resolving these issues is designing
a policy and information architecture that can function together
to achieve both outcomes, and is flexible and resilient enough to
adapt to the rapid pace of technological development and the
evolving nature of the threat.
XI. FINALE
With familiarity, Frankenstein's monster is no longer as
frightening as when he first appears. 38 1 So too, technology's
potential to protect civil liberties and security should be
considered equally with its potential for harm. The mythology of
privacy built on absolute secrecy should not keep us from
considering opportunities to improve both security and privacy
in a world of changing base conditions. The early Luddites were
killed or shipped to Australia to little effect, while later
movements in their name built collaborative institutions to
381 Cf Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, ACLU, Bigger Monster,
Weaker Chains: The Growth of an American Surveillance Society (2003).
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control new technologies. To ensure security with liberty we
should learn from their example.
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